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Introduction 
The launch of the Euro on 1 January 1999, and the introduction of the euro notes and coins on 
1 January 2002 represented the highest point of a long-standing process of ever tighter economic and 
monetary integration in Europe. The single European currency is now a tangible reality in 12 
European countries with a combined population of almost 310 million people and accounting for 
roughly 16 percent of world GDP. As a monetary integration scheme, the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) is without precedent in terms of its scale and complexity and it is unique in combining 
centralized monetary management with national sovereignty retained over fiscal and other policies.  
Notwithstanding the large body of economic research that over the years has tried to predict 
and assess the impact of EMU on the behaviour of economic agents as well as its reflections on 
economic developments and institutions, the Euro area remains a relatively new economic entity, 
with characteristics possibly still not fully understood. 
Among the many important effects, the trade impact has attracted great attention from policy 
makers and scholars. EMU provides a unique opportunity to observe the trade effects of exchange 
rate regime changes and to address a number of unsettled issues. Is monetary union just a reduction in 
transaction costs? If so, how large a reduction? Is it something qualitatively different, to do with 
uncertainties faced by the firm? What is the cost for a country of foregoing the improved access to the 
intra-union markets? 
In considering these issues, we start our thesis with an overview of the costs, for trade flows, 
of crossing borders (a.k.a. border effect) and an assessment of the importance of volatile exchange 
rates as an impediment to trade and determinant of the border effect. Second, we estimate the impact 
of EMU and exchange rate uncertainty on euro area trade volume data with a view to formulate 
regularities on the trade effects of exchange rate regime changes. Finally, we turn to the effect of 
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monetary union and, more generally, exchange rate variability on the international transmission of 
price shocks via the imported/exported inflation channel.  
Throughout the entire analysis, we pay particular attention to the industry dimension and at 
how different industries and industry characteristics are affected by exchange rate variability, 
uncertainty and regime switches. This is justified by a large body of economic literature according to 
which the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade highly depends on the 
characteristics of a particular firm, and by extension, industry and/or market. The degree of risk 
aversion, the existence of comparative advantages or disadvantages, the access to forward markets, 
the size and degree of market competition, the pricing strategy of the firm, profit opportunities as well 
as entry, exit and sunk costs are all crucial factors which determine the sign and size of the 
relationship. Hence, the impact of exchange rates variability and uncertainty over trade flows and 
prices entails an essentially empirical aspect that can best be dealt at firm/industry level.  
In chapter 1, we evaluate the trade and border effect of 12 EU countries in the period from 
1976 to 1995 by making use of 3-digit industry level production and import data. In this chapter a 
gravity model – deriving the estimating equation from first principles, carefully dealing with the 
measurement of distance and the fact that the prices of goods from third nation can affect bilateral 
trade flows – is used to assess the importance of volatile exchange rates as an impediment to trade. In 
a second instance we enquire on how the volatility-trade link performs in different sectors and if the 
resulting discrepancies among sector-specific effects can be explained by well defined industry 
characteristics including market structure, prevailing production technology and scale intensity.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the impact of Europe’s monetary union on trade, by proposing an 
analysis of sectoral data. We empirically test a gravity-like model of trade, using a range of different 
specifications. This allows us to experiment on result sensitivity to the chosen specification for 
exchange rate uncertainty, for the size variable of the gravity equation and for different sectors. We 
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introduce both an exchange rate uncertainty term (proxied by two alternative measures: the variance 
of the nominal exchange rate return, VOL, and the absolute forecast premium, AFP) and an EMU 
dummy into our model. The joint significance of the exchange rate uncertainty term and of the EMU 
dummy leads us to look into possible non-linearities in the trade effects of exchange rate volatility 
and uncertainty.   
In chapter 3 we turn to the analysis of trade prices. Standard estimates of price transmission 
speed (Rogoff 1996, Goldberg and Knetter 1997) suggest that trade’s price-homogenising effects 
operate too slowly to matter much – so slowly that many find the domestic-foreign price gap to be a 
random walk. However, some new empirical evidence (Parsley and Wei 2001, and Asplund and 
Friberg 2001) suggests that a reduction in exchange rate variability reduces the variability of 
international price differences. Moreover, the effect seems to be highly nonlinear, and monetary 
union seems to have an effect even controlling for exchange rate volatility.  
We suppose that firms can be modelled as having a continuous choice of progressively more 
expensive segmentation strategies that result in them being able to maintain correspondingly larger 
price gaps. We call such price-gaps “no-arbitrage bands”. In this context we can formulate an 
empirically testable prediction, i.e. that the no-arbitrage bands should be wider for bilateral trading 
relationships where firms anticipate a higher level of exchange rate volatility. To test this prediction 
we rely on a ‘natural experiment’ from Europe. While most intra-European bilateral exchange rates 
were volatile in the 1980s and 1990s, one group of countries – the DM bloc – consistently maintained 
very narrow margins of fluctuation. We therefore test if pass-through was quickest for intra-DM bloc 
trade. We do so by estimating a model where firms choose the extent to which they can bilaterally 
‘price to market’ by investing in mechanisms that increase the cost of cross-border price arbitrage. As 
a statistical methodology we use threshold autoregressive (TAR) processes, which have been proven 
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to be powerful tools for modelling purchasing power parity (PPP) in the presence of international 
trade and arbitrage costs.  
Two findings emerge as fundamental from this study: 
 First, as documented in all three chapters, exchange rate volatility has a negative impact 
on trade. Moreover, the effect appears to be nonlinear, and monetary union seems to 
affect trade volumes even when controlling for exchange rate volatility. Analogous 
empirical results come from the analysis on the effect on trade prices. These broadly 
support the predictions that, ceteris paribus, trade partners with lower bilateral exchange 
rate volatility should experience more rapid movements back towards the law of one 
price.  
 Second, sector-specific estimates of the trade effects of both exchange rate volatility and 
monetary union show a rough correlation between the size of the effects and sectors 
marked by imperfect competition and increasing returns, more than trade in competitive 
sectors.  
Together, the thesis’ two findings underscore the importance of monetary union for the 
integration process in Europe and suggest changes likely to affect the optimality of the EU as a 
currency area in several ways. They suggests that formation of a monetary union may lead to a 
change in trade price behaviour by altering the costs and benefits for companies of charging different 
prices in different countries. As a result, we should expect greater harmonisation of prices across 
monetary union members via the imported/exported inflation channel. If monetary union also greatly 
increases the amount of trade among members as claimed by Rose (2000) – and confirmed by many 
subsequent studies, including the present – the harmonisation of prices effect will become even more 
pronounced. Moreover they suggest that monetary union boosts trade in sectors marked by imperfect 
competition and increasing returns. Thus nations that have a large share of bilateral trade in such 
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sectors are more likely to gain more from monetary union. A simple corollary is immediate. Intra-
industry trade is mainly due to the existence of imperfect competition and increasing returns, hence 
nations that engage most in bilateral intra-industry trade are more likely to gain from joining a 
monetary union. 
The thesis also represents a first attempt to justify from a methodological point of view why 
the most recent studies on the subject always report negative and statistically significant effects of 
exchange rates on trade, while in the 1970s and 1980s, despite extensive empirical efforts, no one 
could convincingly demonstrate that a link existed, either positive or negative. Our findings point to a 
clear superiority of panel techniques with fixed effects in a situation involving substantial cross-
nation variation in unobserved variables as well as substantial time-series variation. Furthermore the 
border effect methodology, which allows adding intra-national trade flows – featuring permanent zero 
volatility – to a dataset of country-level data, seems to bolster the volatility effect on trade. 
Assessing the trade effect of EMU is not an easy task. It is difficult to disentangle its impact 
from the effects of other important developments such as the single market programme, technological 
change and globalization. As for the external dimension – i.e trade with non Euro area trade partners 
– it is difficult to distinguish trade effects due to genuine EMU effects from currency misalignments 
and adjustments. Furthermore, there are a number of additional empirical difficulties ranging from 
data aggregation problems to the appropriate empirical specification, and the way exchange rate 
volatility and uncertainty are measured. All these issues are discussed in the following chapters. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, we can still distil some ‘stylised facts’ that suggest some 
interesting developments for further research. We will discuss these in the conclusion to this thesis.  
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Chapter 1 – The Border Effect in a Multi-Currency 
World: What Role for Volatility?* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This chapter evaluates the trade and border effects of exchange rate volatility within 12 EU countries in the 
period 1976-95 by making use of 3-digit industry level production and import data. Intuitively, one expects that 
reducing exchange rate volatility promotes trade by reducing the magnitude of the exchange rate problems. An 
environment with multiple currencies creates difficulties and barriers for cross-border economic activities, for 
example currency exchange problems (cost of hedging, or value uncertainty), and financial costs of exchanges. 
Additionally, multiple currencies affect market transparency and thus firms’ sensitiveness to price differences. 
In this chapter a gravity model – deriving the estimating equation from first principles, carefully dealing with 
the measurement of distance and with the fact that the prices of goods from third nation can affect bilateral 
trade flows – is used to assess the importance of volatile exchange rates as an impediment to  trade. It finds 
that the border effect in Europe reduces of 50 percent once exchange rate volatility is accounted for. 
Furthermore, the chapter suggests that panel estimation techniques with fixed effects and analyses carried out 
at the finest industry echelon might represent efficient ways of testing volatility over trade flows. Finally, the 
chapter investigates on  the impact of volatility on different types of industries. It confirms the sensitivity of 
exchange rate volatility coefficients to differences in market structures and emphasises the benefits of using 
industry level data in empirical investigations. Industries featuring fragmented markets are greatly harmed, 
especially if the given industry has a homogeneous product. Similar problems arise in industries operating in 
segmented markets, but where the product is differentiated.  Volatility seems also to harm technology-based 
and scale-intensive industries as well as those characterised by mainstream production and  mature, 
advertising intensive, products. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: F12; F15; F17 
Keywords: Exchange rate volatility, trade, gravity, border, sector   
                                                   
*
 I wish to thank Thierry Mayer and Keith Head  for providing their 3-digits industry level dataset. I also wish to thank 
Richard Baldwin, Federica Sbergami and Lionel Fontagné for their comments and suggestions. The work reported in this 
chapter is part of a research programme financed by the Commissariat Général du Plan, convention n°5-2000. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last few years, a number of economists have pointed to the massive importance of 
borders for trade flows and the consequent “home market bias”. A seminal paper by Mc Callum 
(1995) found that the US-Canada border represented a substantial impediment to trade between the 
two countries. McCallum's initial paper has given rise to a rapidly growing literature aimed at 
measuring and understanding the trade border effect (BE thereafter)2.   
Why do borders matter? One approach is to question the methods and the measurements. 
Another approach is to accept the result and argue that it points to the great importance of national 
institutions (legal, monetary, social) that promote trade.  
While Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) propose alternative modeling strategies to justify 
McCallum's puzzle, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2000) challenge the existing methods of measuring 
BEs.  Others believe that, because trade depends on networks of connected firms, strong local ties 
have formed over time and have generated trade that tends to outlive its causes. “These networks 
formed over time when borders and distance imposed higher costs because both tariffs and transport 
costs were higher. Members of networks focused on building local relationships. These strong local 
ties generated trade” (Head, 2001). 
Under this latter approach, the BE can be thought of as a measure of our ignorance. It 
quantifies the lack of knowledge about a number of mechanisms entailing unnoticed costs in 
international trade practices or discouraging cross-border transactions. Hence, the BE turns out to be a 
useful tool to "clean" the overall residual level of barriers from identified impediments to trade.  
                                                   
2 The main references are Evans (1999, 2000), Helliwell (1998), Helliwell and McCallum (1995), Wei (1996), Anderson 
and Smith (1999a, b) and, for the European case, Nitsch (1997), Chen (2000) and Head and Mayer (2000).   
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The leading existing explanations as to why borders matter can be ascribed to one of three 
major groupings of identified obstacles: 
 Unobserved and residual tariff and non-tariff barriers  
 Home bias by consumers due to cultural and political factors 
 Exchange rates and monetary arrangements  
Among these "real explanations" the focus is usually put on the importance of cultural 
differences and/or political actions and on the significance of different national institutions in 
constraining trade (via residual international tariffs and quotas, hidden NTBs and transaction costs, 
different standards and customs, and regulatory differences).  
However, a third important determinant of the border effect are the costs linked to the use of 
different currencies among trade partners (Wei, 1996; and Parsley and Wei, 2001). Explicit account 
of the currency dimension requires acknowledgment of two key aspects:  the "pure" transaction costs 
- i.e. the cost of the passage from one money to the other and all costs linked to hedging activities - 
and the costs of value uncertainty on risk averse importers and exporters. The logic of gravity models 
leads to the presumption that both types of costs are negatively correlated with the strength of 
monetary arrangements and that both ought to diminish with the passage from several to one common 
currency.  
The large body of empirical literature produced in the past thirty years has been unable to 
prove incontestably the existence of a significant trade-volatility relationship and assumes that the 
effect of exchange rate variability, if it exists, is certainly not large.  
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, it infers on the volatility-trade link by 
measuring, at 3-digit industry level, the impact of volatility on relative imports and determines what 
part of the border effect, i.e. the cost of crossing a border, can be explained by exchange rate 
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variability. Second, it looks at the sectoral dimension to uncover the industries and industry-
characteristics most sensitive to the fluctuations of the exchange rate volatility. The next section 
presents a model of border effects in monopolistic competition able to account for the existence of a 
multi-currency framework. The following section presents the results and discusses methodological 
issues likely to influence the volatility-trade link. The last section concludes.  
2  A model for the border effect in a multi-currency world 
We estimate a gravity equation, which takes into account the effect of exchange rates and is 
modelled on the lines of the monopolistic competition specification proposed by Head and Mayer 
(2000).  
These authors use a framework of monopolistic competition based on Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) 
and Krugman (1980) and characterised by scale economies of production and “cost-less” product 
differentiation. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) developed a formalization of Chamberlin's concept of 
monopolistic competition according to which an industry contains a number of firms producing 
differentiated products. These firms act as individual monopolists (i.e. choose a variety and a pricing 
strategy so to maximize profits), but additional firms enter a profitable industry until monopoly 
profits are competed away. Hence in equilibrium firms behave as individual monopolists but do not 
enjoy any “monopoly rent”.  The Dixit-Stiglitz utility function for differentiated products under 
monopolistic competition is a symmetric CES function. With arguments X = (X1,...,Xn), the function is 
F(X) = A[iaiXi ]1/ , where ai and A are positive constants and  = 1/(1-) is the elasticity of 
substitution. 
The use of a monopolistic competition framework combined with the CES utility function, 
has allowed to many studies to derive a function very close to a gravity equation, i.e. Anderson 
(1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand (1985) and Head and Mayer (2000).   
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Here we refer to the Head and Mayer (2000) specification, based on the modeling of 
asymmetric bilateral preferences by means of the parameters ‘aij’. (i.e. country-pair specific 
parameters for the utility of consumers). 
2.1 Consumers’ Utility Function and Preferences 
The utility function of the representative consumer in country ‘i’ is at constant elasticity of 
substitution and depends on his preferences ‘aij’ and on the quantity consumed ‘c’ of each variety ‘h’ 
originating from export country ‘j’:  
Equation 2-1 
1
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Denoting imports of country ‘i’ from country ‘j’ as mij=cijpij  and mi= kmik, bilateral imports 
can be obtained by summing imports of all varieties.  
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where ‘aij’ represents the bilateral preferences, ‘nj’  the number of varieties produced by country ‘j’ 
and ‘pij’ the delivered price of the good traded between countries ‘i’ and ‘j’. Hence, Equation 2-2  
indicates that bilateral trade flows ‘mij’  relate to the demand for imports from country ‘i’ (mi), to the 
offer from country ‘j’ (nj),  to bilateral preferences ‘aij’ and to prices ‘pij’ paid by consumers in ‘i’ for 
goods from ‘j’.  The offer from country ‘j’, bilateral preferences and prices are all intended relative to 
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the offer, bilateral preferences and prices from all alternative trade partners. Transaction costs paid by 
consumers are of iceberg-type3 .  
Preferences encompass a random component and a systematic preference for home produced 
goods of  ‘’. This home bias is assumed to be mitigated by common language between trading 
partners of an amount ‘’ (‘Lij’ is the indicator taking value one for common language). Thus, 
Equation 2-3 
aij=exp[eij - ( - Lij) Bij] 
A gravity equation can be derived from Equation 2-2. However to test empirically this 
relationship: 
 Equation 2-2 needs to be simplified 
 the price paid by consumers needs to be derived 
 the unknown number of varieties produced by each partner (i.e. ‘ni’ and ‘nj’) needs to be 
linked to some known (observable) measure. 
We first focus on the number of varieties produced by each partner. Then, we will show that 
the price paid by the consumers can be easily derived and finally, after explaining the difficulties with 
the present specification of Equation 2-2, how this can be reduced to a more tractable form.  
While the number of varieties produced in each country j is neither known nor observable, the 
value of production is well known.  The behaviour of producers in the model provides the link that 
allows deriving the number of varieties produced by each partner.  
                                                   
3
 An Iceberg cost is a cost of transporting a good that uses up only some fraction of the good itself, rather than using any 
other resources. The concept, due to Samuelson (1954) is based on the idea of floating an iceberg, which is costless except 
for the amount of the iceberg itself that melts. Its tractability, due to the fact that it impacts no other market, makes of this 
concept a very popular way of modelling transport costs. 
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2.2 Firms’ Behaviour 
The model of monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz uses, as a simplifying device, the 
assumption that there are sectors, or “industries” consisting of many products produced with the same 
production function (and technology). Furthermore: 
 Every variety is produced with increasing returns to scale. 
 Economies of scale are relatively small, so that the industry can accommodate many 
producers. 
 Each firm finds most profitable to produce a different variety of the “differentiated 
product”. 
 Every variety of the same product enters into demand in the same way and delivers the 
same profit level than any other variety not yet produced. 
 Labour is the only factor of production. 
In this framework, in country ‘j’, the quantity of work necessary for producing a quantity ‘qj’  
of a representative variety is lj=F j. The existence of the scalar ‘F’ in the equation accounts for the 
characteristic increasing returns to scale in production.   
For a representative firm in country ‘j’, given the salary ‘wj’ and the price ‘pj’ that can be 
charged for variety ‘n’, profits are:  
Equation 2-4 
j = pj qj - wj j) 
Given that we are in a setting of monopolistic competition, firms neglect the impact of their 
behaviour on the general price level. Hence for the first order conditions,  
Equation 2-5 
j  -1) j 
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Therefore, at the mill gate (i.e. before transport costs) all varieties produced are valued at the 
same price. If there are no impediments to entry and exit of firms in a given industry, then the number 
of firms is endogenously determined. In particular, if the number of firms is large enough so as to 
make possible to treat the number of varieties in the industries as a continuous variable rather than an 
integer, then we expect entry and exit to lead to zero profits; namely:   
Equation 2-6 
j =f[(wj; j)] 
Equation 2-5 and Equation 2-6 imply that, in equilibrium, the quantity produced by each firm 
is  
Equation 2-7 

 )1( 

Fq j  
Given the assumptions of identical technology and production functions for all producers, and 
the fact that also the size of production ‘q’ is identical for each firm – so that ‘qj’= ‘q’ in every 
country ‘j’ –  we can write production in country ‘j’ as the product of the number of domestically 
produced varieties times their prices and quantities: 
Equation 2-8 
vj=qpjnj 
This allows using Equation 2-8 to eliminate ‘nj’ from Equation 2-2.  
We now turn to the determination of delivered prices ‘pij’.  In a mono-currency world, 
delivered prices are so defined: 
Equation 2-9 
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pij=[1+Bij]dij pj 
Equation 2-9 states that the bilateral price is a multiplicative function of the mill price ‘pj’, 
distance ‘dij’ and non tariff barriers assuming constant ad valorem NTBs of ‘’  for all cross border 
trade. ‘Bij’, finally is an indicator for the “home bias”, taking value one for ij and zero in the case of 
a country’s production consumed at home or, following Wei’ s (1996) definition, of “trade with 
self”). 
Explicit consideration for an environment with multiple currencies requires the introduction 
in the equation of both a measure for the value uncertainty due to exchange rate fluctuations and one 
for the costs, accountable, of trading in different currencies. This second measure encompasses both 
transaction and hedging costs.  In order to consider all components of cost linked to the multiplicity 
of money and to include domestic and international transportation costs within the same framework, 
we need to simplify and assume that transaction and hedging costs are non known and non-stochastic. 
This allows us to introduce a constant ‘’ for the cost of the passage from one money to the other and 
other fixed costs linked to hedging activities, and a proxy ‘u’ measuring the value uncertainty due to 
exchange rate fluctuations and volatility. 
Thus, the price ‘pij’ paid by consumers in country ‘j’ for products of country ‘i’ is a function 
encompassing the price of the product “at the gate of the mill” ‘pj’, distance ‘dij’, constant ad valorem 
values measuring NTBs ‘’ and hedging and overall transaction costs ‘’, and a stochastic variable 
‘uij’  for non accountable  uncertainty and volatility. 
Equation 2-10 
pij=[1+( +( + 2uij)-  Bij]dij pj 
Iceberg transportation costs are assumed to hold. 
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2.3 Empirically Testable Gravity Equation 
We mentioned earlier that Equation 2-2 needs some kind of manipulation if we want it to 
generate some kind of empirically testable gravity equation. The model of monopolistic competition 
predicts that imports from a particular country in a given industry are related to all alternative sources 
worldwide. Hence, the denominator of the equation contains attributes from all possible origin 
countries of a given product. Reference to all possible alternative suppliers of a given product, creates 
huge difficulties in empirical applications.   
Such difficulties can be overcome following Head and Mayer (2000). Equation 2-2 can be 
expressed in relative terms by subtracting, to both sides of the equation, ‘mii’ – a special case 
indicating a country’s trade with self, i.e. i=j. Imports from self are defined as total production less exports, 
in accordance with Wei (1997)4. In so doing, we obtain the following:  
Equation 2-11 
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Using njpj=vj/q and substituting for pij, aij and nj into the equation for mij expressed in 
logarithms, we attain the following gravity equation: 
Equation 2-12 
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4
 Wei's definition of country’s imports from itself is GGDP = goods part of GDP = (GDP - services - transport - total 
exports).  
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Equation 2-12 relates the decisions of consumers in a given country on how to allocate 
expenditure between goods produced at home and goods from a particular foreign country. In this 
expression, a country’s consumption of foreign goods is a function of relative production ‘v’, distance 
‘d’, prices ‘p’, exchange rate uncertainty u and of the border effect. The border effect is captured by 
the constant (negative) term   ij)1ln()1(    which indicates that the observed values 
of relative trade are lower than predicted by the model for the case of absence of trade barriers.   
The constant term in Equation 2-12 captures the impact of the home bias ‘’, NTBs ‘’ and 
currency transaction and hedging (fixed) costs ‘’. This term is negative if home bias, NTBs and 
monetary related costs are non-negative.  
While the above is definitely a gravity equation, since it relates bilateral trade flows to size 
(production) and distance variables, it also presents non-standard features. Although prices are an 
important determinant of all theoretical models linking trade with the size of GDP (or production) of 
the trading partners (eg. Helpman and Krugman (1985), few are the empirical studies that introduce 
prices on the right-hand side of the equation (Bergstrand, 1985; Baier and Bergstrand; Anderson and 
Wan Wincoop, 2003).  Remoteness, which measures each importer’s set of alternatives, is also an 
important topic connected with distance that has often been overlooked by the empirical literature. A 
possible reason is that results approximate the theoretically correct remoteness values, but not 
accurately enough. Another is that its inclusion in a selective sample of countries is particularly 
problematic. Measures of the remoteness of each trading partner from other possible partners have 
been proposed by Wei (1996), Wolf (1997) and Helliwell (1997). Each of these authors adopts 
different formulations of the remoteness variable involving distance and GDP. The solution proposed 
here follows Head and Mayer (2000) and it is more sophisticated than previous attempts as it 
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describes the full range of potential suppliers to a given importer, taking into account their size, 
distance and relevant costs of crossing the border.  
The importance of taking remoteness into account when measuring the trade/distance 
relationship is better explained by way of exemplifications. The most striking and cited example is 
the comparison of the bilateral trade flows linking Australia and New Zealand with trade between 
Austria and Portugal. These two pairs of countries have distances and GDP products comparable in 
size. Nonetheless, the actual 1995 trade between the two pacific countries was nine times bigger than 
the one between their European counterparts. A gravity model neglecting remoteness would 
erroneously predict a similar bilateral trade for the two country pairs.  
3 Regression Model and Data 
3.1 Regression Model 
From the model outlined in section 2 we derive an empirical specification where the 
dependent variable, relative imports (i.e., imports from others/own imports), is log-linearly regressed 
on relative 3-digit industry level production, relative distance, relative prices and exchange rate 
volatility – an exchange rate volatility measure is used as a proxi for the pure uncertainty component 
while transaction and hedging costs enter into the constant term. Other dummies test for common 
language, non EU membership and non adoption of the ERM. They take value 1 if one of the partners 
does not belong to the EU or to the ERM and if the two trading partners have different languages. The 
constant term accounts for the residual border effect which includes hedging and transaction costs 
linked to a multi-currency setting.  The specification for the equation, with all variables expressed in 
logs, is: 
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Equation 3-1 
LangnoEUnoERMxrvol
p
p
d
d
v
v
m
m
ij
ii
ij
ii
ij
ii
ij
ii
ij
76543210    
While we expect 1 and  7  to be positive and all other coefficients negative, we have no 
priors on the sign of 4. 
3.2 Data 
The dataset covers 12 European countries over the period 1976-1995, i.e. the 12 members of 
the European Union before the enlargement of 1995. The data consist of trade and production data 
classified according to industry. Bilateral trade data covers 113 NACE 3 digits industries while 
production data is disaggregated at 3-digit level and covers 120 NACE 3-digit manufacturing 
industries. Distance data are constructed using regional data where ‘dij’ is defined as the distance 
between the centres of sub-national units (regions ‘i’ and ‘j’) multiplied by the economic weight of 
region ‘i’, calculated as the share of two-digit industry level employment for origin weights and GDP 
for destination weights. Bilateral exchange rate volatility, on the contrary, is by country-pair but not 
industry-specific. A number of indicators is also used.  They test for factor intensities, technology 
requirement, production modes, market structure and labour skills. The indicator for production 
conditions is derived from the WIFO classification based on the work of Davies and Lyons (1996). 
The other indicators have been constructed based on the OECD Classification of Sectors of Activity 
based on Technological Intensities and on OECD Industrial Sectors Classifications. Part of the 
dataset has been kindly made available by Keith Head and Thierry Mayer. 
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4  Results 
We begin by aggregate estimations of the gravity equation in order to assess the explanatory 
power and significance of volatility over relative imports. We will then show that volatility accounts 
for about half of the known estimates on the border effect in Europe. 
Two different specifications of exchange rate volatility are proposed. The first specification 
measures volatility as moving average of the standard deviation of the first difference of the monthly 
natural log of the nominal exchange rate (IFS line ae) in the five years preceding period t. This 
specification allows comparing our results with Rose’s numbers, who uses a similar specification. 
Furthermore, empirical findings in chapter 2 support the use of this specification. They show that 
importers are most likely to "remember" past episodes of significant exchange rate volatility having 
taken place over the previous five years. By experimenting with various moving average measures of 
volatility ranging from one to nine years, they find that the five-years specification registers both the 
highest t-statistics and the highest adjusted R-squared.  
A second specification proposed here measures volatility as the standard deviation of first 
differences of the monthly natural log of the nominal exchange rate in the year following period t. 
This tests the hypothesis that importers are forward looking and perfectly rational. Both t-statistics 
and R-squared support the use of such a specification. Relevance of non membership to ERM and to 
ERM narrow band is also tested. 
All the results are carried out by means of a Heckman two-step procedure. This method 
consists in estimating a probit to determine the mode of selection of observed flows and to correct 
then the OLS equation with the deriving “Mill’s ratio”. This method provides non-biased coefficients 
and t-statistics. The exogeneity of the selection process is not rejected while the coefficient of 
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correlation between the probit and the equation of the model are non-significant. We correct for 
potential   heterosckedasticity using the method by White (1980). 
 
Table 4-1:  Volatility as a barrier to trade, 1976-1990 
Dependent variable: Ln(partner imports/own imports) 
 
 
 Observed  volatility  
(5 years MA) 
Forward looking volatility 
(1 year ahead) 
 Not ERM Not ERM narrow 
band 
Not ERM Not ERM narrow 
band 
Border -2.36 -2.29 -2.59 -2.51 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln rel. production 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln rel. distance -1.28 -1.27 -1.32 -1.32 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln rel. price -0.7 -0.799 -0.75 -0.85 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Vol_5years -19.64 -19.33   
 
(1.1) (1.12)   
Vol_RE   -5.94 -6.27 
 
  (0.75) (0.74) 
Not ERM -0.22  -0.27  
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  
Not ERM narrow band  -0.30 
(0.02) 
 -0.34 
(0.02) 
Not EU Member -0.32 -0.30 -0.40 -0.46 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Common Language 1.35 
 
1.35 
 
1.44 
 
1.44 
 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Mills Ratio -0.61 0.92 -0.86 0.67 
 
(0.02) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) 
 
    
Observations 53657 53657 53657 53657 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year effects yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.442 0.432 0.433 0.429 
First, we report OLS estimates for data pooled  through years 1976-1990 and with volatility 
measured as a 5 years moving average. Results are reported for both non-ERM membership and non-
ERM narrow band membership dummies. Coefficients are all significant and of the expected sign. 
The coefficient for volatility is remarkably high compared to other findings in the literature (i.e. -
19.64 -or -19.33, according to dummy specifications- vs). We will investigate this issue in detail in 
the next section.  
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Then we report a second volatility specification (right-hand side columns) which assumes 
forward looking and perfectly rational importers. Coefficients for expected volatility are -5.94 and -
6.27 respectively for the non-ERM membership and non-ERM narrow band membership dummies.  
For both specifications, year specific estimations for years 1980, 1985 and 1990 report similar 
coefficients.  
We now turn to analyse what part of the border effect can be explained by volatility. In order 
to do so, we estimate our model over the same data sample as in Head and Mayer (2000) and and 
compare the results. The dataset covers 12 EU countries before the implementation of the single 
market (1984-1986).  
4.1 Part of Border Effect Explained by Exchange Rate Volatility  
Head and Mayer (2000) measured the border effect in Europe and found that, for the average 
industry in 1985, Europeans purchased 14 times more from domestic producers than from equally 
distant foreign ones and that the tariff equivalent of the border for the period 1984-1986 was at least 
36 percent. 
In an attempt to find the causes of such a large BE, they decomposed it into government 
actions that impede trade and unspecified consumer preferences. They found that NTBs, before the 
launch of the European Single Market, were responsible for at most 10 percent of the total effect. On 
the other hand, the coefficients on the consumer bias were systematically positive and statistically 
significant in half the regressions. They advanced that such a strong consumer bias could be "the 
outcome of cultural differences or the legacy of past protection that caused domestic suppliers to 
adapt their product offerings to suit local tastes" (p. 285).   
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In what follows we measure the importance of exchange rates and monetary arrangements –  
the costs linked to the use of different currencies among trade partners – as a determinant of the 
border effect. Three specifications are here proposed:  
 normal OLS; 
 OLS using the Heckman (2-steps) procedure and; 
 OLS with the difference between relative imports and relative production as dependent 
variables, using the Heckman (2-steps) procedure.  
The reason for proposing a third specification, with relative production in the left-hand side of 
the equation, is highlighted by Mayer (2000). Statistics on production are potentially subject to 
frequent and, sometimes severe, measurement errors. If production is imprecisely estimated, the 
coefficient for relative production will be biased and, due to cross-correlations, it might also produce 
biased coefficient for other variables.  Hence, the specification of Equation 4-1, where the coefficient 
on the log of relative production is forced to assume unit value, as predicted by the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model, is proposed: 
Equation 4-1 
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Relative production, no longer among the explanatory variables, shouldn’t  represent a source 
of simultaneity problems.  
  Table 4-2 shows that volatility accounts for more than half of the overall BE as estimated by 
Head and Mayer. It reports results for the period 1984-1986 from both our study - in columns (4) to 
(6) - and from Head and Mayer (2000) - in columns (1) to (3). Their comparison shows how 
exchange rate volatility contributes to explain the overall border effect. Column (1) and (4) report 
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OLS estimations for pooled years 1984-1986 and column (2) and (5) report results obtained using 
Heckman (1979) two stages procedure, which is aimed at avoiding the generation of selection bias, 
by testing for non-randomly missing observations. Finally, in column (3) and (6) relative production 
is forced to be one as predicted by the Dixit-Stiglitz model.   
Specific account of volatility in equation (2), using Heckman, reduces the border effect measured by 
Head and Mayer calculated using the same methodology (equation 2) from 19.49 (exp. 2.97) to 12.06 
(exp 2.49), i.e. after controlling for volatility, the border effect is reduced in size by more than 50 
percent.   
Table 4-2:  Border effects in the EU, 1984-1986 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(partner imports/own 
imports) 
Head and Mayer (2000) Our calculations 
 1984-1986 1984-1986 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Border -2.75*** -2.97*** -2.48*** -2.42*** -2.49*** -2.07*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ln rel. production 0.85*** 0.80***  0.83*** 0.83***  
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  
Ln rel. distance -1.29*** -1.06*** -1.45*** -1.2*** -1.15*** -1.47*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Ln rel. price -0.75*** -0.82*** -1.18*** -0.66*** -0.68*** -1.02*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Volatility    -22.57*** -21.26*** -21.34*** 
 
   (2.3) (2.5) (2.49) 
Not EU Member -0.52*** -0.39*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.39*** -0.41*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Common Language 1.57*** 1.58*** 1.47*** 1.57*** 1.58*** 1.47*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Mills ratio  -2.30*** -0.31***  -0.61*** 0.92*** 
 
 (0.25) (0.23)  (0.024) (0.22) 
 
   
   
No. observations 12892 12892 12892 12892 12892 12892 
R-squared 0.414 0.421 0.241 0.431 0.459 0.442 
standard errors in parentheses with  (***) denoting significance at 1 percent. 
 
The existence of trade increasing effects of currency unions, and, by extension, of more stable 
exchange rates, is definitely in line with intuitive reasoning. However, for long it has been difficult to 
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find supporting empirical evidence.  Hence we need to understand why our results are clearly in 
favour of a negative volatility-trade link. 
4.2 Has the World Changed or is it a Methodological Matter? 
A number of recent contributions to the debate on the exchange rate volatility-trade 
relationship, also report systematically negative and statistically robust coefficients. What are their 
characteristics? Can we detect common features with our empirical test? Answers to these issues will 
hopefully help to better characterize the volatility-trade link.  
In this section we will compare our results with those of three recent papers that find volatility 
to negatively affect trade. We will look for regularities and differences in the strategies and 
methodologies used. The works under review are Dell’Ariccia (1998), Pugh et al. (1999), and Rose 
(2000). All the papers under review test a gravity model in its augmented version.  A summary of the 
four studies (including the present) is presented in Table 4-3 and Table 4-4. Here we present the 
general conclusions.  
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Table 4-3:  Empirical specifications compared 
Our specification Rose (2000) Pugh & al. (1999) Dell’Ariccia (1998)
Dependent variable Log(Mijt/Miit) Log (X+M)ijt Log Xijt Log (X+M)ijt
Size variables:
GDP log(YiYj) β1log(Yit)+β2log(Yjt) log(YitYjt)
Per Capita GDP log(YiYj/popipopj)
Population log(popit)+β4(popjt) β3log(popitpopjt)
Production V.A. log(Prodj/Prodi)
Prices log(Pj/Pi)
Distance Sub-national weighted 
log(Distijt/Distiit) 
Great circle formula c.i.f. imports less f.o.b. 
exports
Great circle formula
Remoteness Inclusive value
Exchange rate vol. yes yes yes yes
Dummies:
Common border yes yes yes
Language yes yes yes yes
EU yes yes yes
Non-ERM yes yes
FTA yes yes
NTBs yes
Home bias yes
Common nation (i.e. 
French overseas dept.s)
yes
Common colonizer yes
Colony/colonizer yes
Currency union yes
 
 
In all the papers, trade is measured at a bilateral level, and in one case only, disaggregated by 
industry (3-digit level of detail). The dependent variable in Dell’Ariccia and Rose is total bilateral 
trade while in Pugh it is exports. In our study, imports are used and preference is given to a relative 
specification of the equation where all bilateral values are measured relative to domestic values. 
Other differences between our econometric specification and the other three papers are the use of 
production data instead of GDP and the inclusion of relative prices, which derives from the 
monopolistic competition setting. Specific dummies account for regional monetary arrangements. 
Pugh et al. split the effect by including two dummies: ShiftDV and SlopeDV, which, for intra ERM-
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trade, take respectively, value 1 and value equal to the bilateral volatility (ERijt).  They both amount 
to zero otherwise.  The other dummies included reflect specific aims of the studies. 
Table 4-4:  A summary table of  data used and results 
Author Our specification Rose (2000) Pugh et al. (1999) Dell’Ariccia (1998)
Area The 12 EU countries before 
1995 enlargement
186 countries worldwide 16 OECD countries 15 EU countries and Switzerland
Period covered 1976-1995 5 different years: 1970, 
1975, 1980; 1985;1990
(i)1980-1992 for the import 
demand fcn (ii)1984-1990 
for the gravity model
1975-1994
Estimating model/models Gravity model with borde 
effect
Gravity model Aggregate import demand 
equation and gravity model
Gravity model
Estimating technique Panel OLS for separate years 
and panel with year 
controls
Panel and OLS Panel with fixed effects
Disaggregation of data Industry specific bilateral  
trade             ( 3-digit 
manuf. industries)
Gross bilateral  trade Gross bilateral  trade Gross bilateral  trade 
Exchange rate volatility 
specification
std dev. of the first diff. of  
montly nat. log of bil. nom. 
exch. rate. 
std dev. of the first diff. of  
montly nat. log of bil. 
nom. exch. rate. 
2 different specifications: 
log std dev of annual % 
changes; xr variability slope 
dummy in logs
3 different specifications of both 
nominal and real monthly data 
Coefficients for volatility (i) Unconstrained panel : -
19.64 (1.1) ;                     
(ii) Heckit proced.: -21.26 
(2.5)
1970: -0.062 (0.012); 
1975: -0.001 (0.008), 
1980: 0.060 (0.010); 
1985: -0.028 (0.005); 
1990: -0.009 (0.002); 
pooled: -0.017 (0.002)
gravity model results: (i)log 
std dev of annual % change  
-0.59 (-4.10);                   
(ii)exch. rate variability 
slope dummy in logs 0.48 
(2.46)
(i) std.dev.nom: -2.84 (0.608) ;         
(ii) std.dev.real -4.15 (0.645) ;          
(iii) fwd err.:-0.25 (0.034)
 
 
While Dell’Ariccia focuses on European countries, Pugh’s sample covers sixteen OECD 
countries. Finally Rose tests 186 countries, dependencies, territories, colonies, etc. for which the UN 
statistical office gathers international trade data.  
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4.2.1 The Volatility Coefficient 
Exchange rate volatility is measured in various manners. This reflects the fact that when it 
comes to measures of exchange rate volatility and variability as a proxy for risk, the specification 
depends on the type of exchange rate risk relevant to the importer and/or exporter. This in turn 
depends on the model of trading firm that is examined and the nature of its trading activities. 
Pugh uses moving standard deviations from annual levels of the real effective exchange rate 
for the panel and two different specifications for the gravity equation estimated by OLS: the standard 
deviation of annual percentage changes in the nominal bilateral exchange rates and the average 
absolute annual percentage changes.  Our study, Dell’Ariccia and Rose use the standard deviation of 
the first difference of the monthly natural logarithm of the bilateral nominal exchange rate. 
Dell’Ariccia, checks also two more proxies: the sum of the square of the forward errors and the 
percentage difference between the maximum and the minimum of the nominal spot rate5. It finds that 
all the volatility variables tested give similar results. Furthermore volatility in nominal and real terms 
turns out to be highly correlated.  
As previously mentioned, all studies report negatively signed and significant volatility 
coefficients using bilateral trade data, panel techniques with fixed effects and gravity modelling, 
which allow depicting otherwise overlooked elements of the relationship between volatility and trade. 
In summary, it seems that panel techniques in a situation involving substantial cross-nation variation 
in unobserved variables as well as substantial time-series variation clearly demonstrate a negative 
effect of volatility on trade.  
                                                   
5
 The advantage of the first measure is that, under target zone regimes, or pegged but adjustable exchange rates, it would 
unveil the presence of a “peso problem” or the lack of credibility of the official parity. As for the second measure, on the 
other hand, it is deemed to stress the importance of medium run uncertainty (Dell’Ariccia) 
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The reason for this may lie in a clear superiority of panel techniques, in particular when 
combined to fixed effects, over cross sectional or time series analysis. The volatility term in a time 
series analysis may capture the volatility of other variables in the model. The effect of the latter might 
differ from what we expect from exchange rate volatility, so that the total outcome is uncertain. The 
problem of cross sectional studies is that their outcome may be heavily dependent on the selected 
countries. A heterogeneous sample of countries could lead to an estimation bias due to omitted 
variables driving trade flows in different countries. For instance Wei (1996) in a cross sectional study 
estimating the home bias for 19 OECD countries in four separate years (1982,1986, 1990 and 1994) 
finds a positive effect of volatility on trade. We believe that  this outcome may be affected by an 
estimation bias due to omitted variables driving trade flows in the different countries for which this 
study does not control. A solution to the above mentioned shortcomings is to use fixed-effects 
estimators on panel data6. 
Although the dependent variable in Rose, Pugh and Dell’ Aricccia in different from ours, the 
empirical findings are qualitatively in line with our results. Nevertheless, there is a dimensional 
difference in the volatility coefficients that needs investigation.  While our study reports the highest 
coefficients of all (-20 ca.), the other three papers have coefficients ranging between -4.15 and -0.001. 
Thus, our next step will be to propose an explanation of the difference in magnitude between our 
results and the one of the other papers under review. There are two elements of discrepancy between 
our study and the other three papers analysed here: 
 Our study is the only one that tests a border effect model instead of a simple gravity 
specification and  
 It uses disaggregated data instead of total trade.  
                                                   
6
 The issue is analysed in detail in chapter 2. 
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Since we find a statistically robust, large and negative parameter for volatility on bilateral 
imports it is worth discussing the two above mentioned characteristics of our analysis. 
4.2.2 The Use of Border Effect Modelling: A Country as a Limiting Case of a 
Monetary Union 
Only a few years back, Frankel (1997, p.68) commented "in an ideal world we would have 
data on bilateral trade among provinces, or even among smaller geographical units". He mentioned 
that the most important advantage of using data at the provincial level would be the ability to 
"ascertain how trade between two geographical entities is affected by their common membership in a 
political union". Only in recent years, and only for a limited set of countries, systematic measures of 
internal trade flows became available. 
The border effect methodology allows to pool together international and intra-national trade 
flows. This methodology is particularly useful in assessing the effect of exchange rate volatility and 
monetary regimes such as the single currency because it adds to a dataset, observations where 
volatility is null by definition. In so doing, it provides us with a virtually complete dataset, with 
observations crossing the whole range of possible values, including permanent zero volatility. 
Speculations on the importance of the geopolitical (and monetary) links for trade can be appreciated, 
for example, in the literature examining the trade effects of free trade areas or the one about historical 
events such as political unions that formed or split apart7.   
In order to test whether the relative – border effect – specification  has an effect on the results 
for volatility, we re-estimate our sample in a non-relative specification which excludes intra-national 
data from estimation. When using a non-relative specification, which corresponds to excluding intra-
national data from estimation, our volatility coefficients have little significance.  
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We deem useful, at this stage, to provide a direct comparison between our and Rose’s results. 
For sake of comparability with Rose’ s results we estimate bilateral imports as a function of the 
product of exporter’s output and importer’ s consumption and we drop the price coefficients with 
ji 
.  Table 4-5 reports the results of non-relative estimations run for the same years as in Rose. 
The coefficient for volatility is non significant for three of the five years tested and significant 
at the 10 percent level in the remaining two years.  It turns out to be significant only for the pooled 
sample but its coefficient is four times smaller than it was when using the border effect technique and 
including intra-national data. Aware of the instability of the volatility coefficient over time we also 
tried pooling two to three years in each column. This has proved to slightly stabilise coefficients that, 
however, remain qualitatively in line with the results reported below.  
Table 4-5:  Non-relative estimates: a comparison with Rose (2000) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 Pooled 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 Panel
1.28 1.09 1.4 1.51 1.21
(0.41) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.14)
0.001 -0.06 -0.028 -0.009 -0.017
-16.79(**) 7.42 -2.00 -0.90 -10.07(**) -5.91
(0.008) (0.01) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (6.96) (5.54) (4.21) (3.74) (4.49) (2.10)
0.81 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.61 0.63 0.41 0.51 0.51 0.57
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.66 0.61 0.66 0.73 0.66
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
-1.15 -1.03 -1.05 -1.12 -1.09 -1.83 -2.41 -2.21 -1.99 -2.00 -1.83
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
1.02 1.26 1.21 0.67 0.99 drop -0.67 0.06 drop drop -0.04
(0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06)
0.36 0.28 0.36 0.50 0.40 0.34(**) -0.22 0.12 0.05 -0.06 0.14(*)
(0.1) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.08)
Obs. 4474 5092 5091 4239 22,984 Obs. 2363 3673 4129 5460 5460 15625
R2 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.63 R-sq 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.48
RMSE 2.18 2.03 1.94 1.75 2.02 RMSE 1.82 2.00 1.95 1.86 1.86 1.94
(**) Significant at 10 percent level
Numbers in bold are non signif. 
Rose (2000) Our estimations
Currency Union
Exchange rate 
vol.
Exchange rate vol.
Distance Distance
Output Exporter’s Output 
* Importer’s 
Consump.
Output per 
Capita
FTA Not a EU member
Common 
language
Common language
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 Flanderau and Morel (2001) for empirical evidence from 19th century Europe. 
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We will now turn to the analysis of disaggregated data. An extensive literature on the 
exchange rate pass-trough, and advances in several other fields of international trade and industrial 
organisation  have in fact demonstrated that aggregate data do not allow to take into account the 
sector specific nature of production and market structures as, in aggregate analyses, opposing effects 
cancel out. 
4.3  Industry dimension 
A final task of this chapter is to identify the volatility/trade link at industry level. According to 
the literature on pass-through, a sector’s market structure has an important effect on firms’ pricing 
behavior in international markets. Industry-specific features such as the degree of industrial 
concentration and non-tariff barriers, the relative location of reference markets and competitors, the 
extent of vertical differentiation and the magnitude of economies of scale greatly influences the trade 
effects found at an aggregated international level (see Knetter and Goldberg, 1997 for a review of the 
literature on pass-through). 
A closer look at industry specific volatility coefficients will be instructive relative to the 
impact of volatility on given sectors and its interplay with industry characteristics. It will also provide 
an indication of which type of trade it harms mostly.  
Estimates have been carried out for two data-periods: 1975-90 and 1992-1995.  While we 
selected the first sub-period (1975-90) to be the same as the one previously employed for 
measurement of overall volatility, the choice of the second sub-period was dictated in an effort to 
cover the outcome of the Single Market process8.   
                                                   
8
 Shortly after the initial announcement of the legislative program, in 1985, most EU firms began to adopt the new policy 
outlook that foresaw full elimination of the targeted barriers by end 1992 (CEC,1997). 
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Table 4-6:  Exchange rate volatility by NACE industry after the implementation of the single market 
Industry 
NACE code Industry name
volatility 
coefficient
Industry 
NACE code Industry name
volatility 
coefficient
120 Coke ovens -288.67 465 Wood n.e.s -22.6
423 Food n.e.s -89.06 442 Leather-products -22.56
417 Pasta -81.44 257 Pharmaceuticals -22.37
352 Motor vehicles-bodies -75.06 414 Vegetables -21.14
244 Asbestos -68.66 311 Foundries -21.02
495 Manufacturing n.e.s -59.89 256 Industrial chem. n.e.s -20.59
353 Motor vehicles-parts -57.81 316 Tools etc. -20.39
351 Motor vehicles-ass & eng -57.4 326 Transmission eq. -20.22
346 Electrical apps.-domestic -56 314 Structural metal -18.62
451 Footwear- mass -52.99 411 Oils and fats -17.13
455 Textiles-households -52.57 223 Steel-preprocess -16.86
345 Receivers-TV & Radio -51.19 415 Fish -16.45
251 Industrial chem. -50.98 453 Clothing -16.21
461 Wood-sawing -49.82 247 Glass -16.11
241 Clay -48.49 438 Floor coverings -15.17
428 Soft drinks -47.7 439 Textile n.e.s -12.54
343 Electrical apps.-indl. -47.4 248 Ceramics -8.96
436 Knitting -44.64 312 Forging -7.25
258 Soap -42.55 466 Cork & brushes -5.45
467 Wooden furniture -41.79 221 Iron and steel -5.2
441 Leather-tanning -41.64 344 Telecoms -4.41
243 Concrete -40.68
140 Oil refining -40.46
483 Plastics -39.81 224 Non-ferrous metals-prod. ns
364 Aerospace -39.37 242 Cement ns
471 Pulp & paper -38.64 255 Paint & Ink ns
462 Wood-processed -37.39 259 Household chem. n.e.s ns
473 Printing -37.35 322 Machine-tools ns
422 Poultry -36.68 323 Machinery-textile ns
429 Tobacco -36.51 342 Electrical plant ns
246 Abrasives -36.44 365 Transport eq. n.e.s ns
260 Man-made fibres -34.79 372 Medical eq. ns
413 dairy -34.14 374 Clocks ns
324 Machinery-food & chem. -33.91 416 Grain milling ns
412 Meat -33.02 418 Starch ns
371 Precision ins. -33 420 Sugar ns
472 Paper processing -32.66 424 Distilling ns
362 Railway -32.59 425 Wine ns
463 Carpentry -32.58 427 Beer ns
327 Machinery-misc -31.46 464 Wooden containers ns
315 Metal containers -29.99 481 Rubber ns
373 Optical ins. -29.3 482 Used tyres ns
341 Wires -28.55 491 Jewellery ns
330 Machinery-office -27.77 492 Musical ins. ns
313 Metals transformation -27.35 493 Graphic labs ns
421 Confectionery -26.67 494 Toys and sports ns
363 Cycles -26.23 420 Sugar ns
419 Bread -24.71
347 Lighting eq. -24.44 328 Machinery n.e.s 18
222 Steel tubes -24.27 321 Machinery- agricultural 23.54
245 Stone -23.93 361 Shipbuilding 24.46
325 Machinery-engineering -22.65 456 Furs 53.81
Industries ranked by coefficient for exchange rate volatility (1992-1995)
Industries with statistically non signif. volatility 
Industries with positive and signif. volatility 
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Coefficients for pooled years 1992-1995 are reported in Table 4-6. Coefficients for pooled 
years 1975-90 are reported in the annex. The industries are ordered in terms of increasing magnitude 
of volatility coefficient. 
Among the most harmed industries we find many industries whose markets are of 
monopolistic competition type (food, industrial chemicals, footwear, textiles, and consumer 
appliances). Volatility seems to be statistically non significant for many commodities while it results 
positive for some luxury goods or highly concentrated markets – i.e. furs and shipbuilding. 
Agricultural machinery also seems positively affected by exchange rate volatility.  
In order to extract more information from the sector-level estimations, a number of indicators, 
aimed at detecting if particular industry characteristics determine a different impact of volatility over 
trade, are constructed. The indicators test for labour skills, market structure, technology requirements, 
production conditions and factor intensities.  
The market structure indicator is particularly interesting for our purposes. It identifies two 
criteria of classification, one for the market the other for the product. Markets can be fragmented – 
i.e. production is carried out by a large number of producers operating in the same markets – or 
segmented, hindering and deterring outside producers willing to entry the market. Products can be 
homogeneous or differentiated in many varieties.  
The approach chosen is the following. Industries are grouped according to one of five 
classifications and Heckman estimations are carried out over the resulting homogeneous sub sample 
for periods 1976-1990 and 1992-1995. Fragmented-homogeneous industries include silk, toys and 
sports, footwear, tailoring and clothing, lether products and pharmaceuticals. The segmented 
differentiated group includes industrial chemicals, cycles and motor vehicles assembled and parts of. 
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At the other end of the range, the segmented homogeneous type of industries includes coke ovens, 
foundries, iron and steel, steel tubes, shipbuilding and non-ferrous metals 
Results shown below report the volatility coefficients relating to the sub-samples.. 
Table 4-7:  Industry characteristics and volatility 
 1976-1990 1992-1995 
Classification  modes Observed 
volatilty  
Expected 
volatility 
Observed 
volatilty  
Expected 
volatility 
skilled -13.76 -1.62 -13.8 -2.10 Labour Skills 
non-skilled -15.66 -4.23* -12.57 6.03 
fragmented-differentiated -10.20 -3.32 -8.27 ns 
segmented-differentiated -13.54 -4.03 -13.09 4.01* 
fragmented-homogeneous -16.28 -4.38 -14.8 ns 
Market Structure 
segmented -homogeneous -8.72 ns -7.19 ns 
high -8.12 ns -14.25 -2.89 
medium -29.45 ns -24.20 -0.28 
Technological Intensities 
low -16.3 -4.63 ns ns 
research intensive -14.95 ns ns ns 
advertising intensive -17.38 -6.74 -12.32 -2.57* 
capital intensive -8.65 ns -12.12 ns 
labour intensive -3.21* ns ns ns 
Production Modes 
 
 
mainstream -26.63 -5.2 -22.51 6.32 
labour intensive -9.18 ns -6.93 4.38 
resources intensive -17.2 -4.8 -17.21 -3.66 
science based ns 6.57 19.62 6.41* 
scale intensive -30.27 -6.39 -25.67 -6.97 
Factor Intensities 
spec. suppl. based -12.95 ns -10.78* ns 
Note: ns. Indicates that coefficients are statistically non significant, * indicates 10% significance. In all other cases 
coefficients are below 5% significance threshold. 
 
Table 4-7 reveals that volatility has a negative effect on most types of industries, 
independently from their classification. The exception is represented by those industries where 
science (R&D) is the most intensive factor of production. Focusing on results for the period 1992-
1995, we notice that while the prevailing skill level in an industry doesn’t determine the way this 
latter is affected by volatility, the market structure is very important. Industries where fragmented 
markets are the norm are the most harmed, especially if the given industry has a homogeneous 
product. Similar problems arise for industries operating in segmented markets, but where the product 
is differentiated. The volatility effect is noticeably lower for those industries that offer a differentiated 
product but operate in segmented markets. Finally it is lowest for segmented markets characterised by 
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a homogeneous product.  Volatility seems also to harm technology based and scale intensive 
industries as well as those characterised by mainstream production or by mature, advertising 
intensive, products. 
 
5  Conclusion 
Research on the volatility-trade link has moved from a utility maximizing approach to models 
where geography plays a key role as a determinant of the density of economic linkages and where 
additional trade-influencing factors can be tested. With each generation of studies, the economic 
interpretation of the relationship has become more focused.  
Aggregate and purely international analyses might lead to biased results. On the other hand, 
studies on specific products and regions run the risk of being unrepresentative and their results may 
not hold theoretically with generality. The conclusion from this investigation, which ought to affect 
the way we think, is that empirical studies carried out at the level of sub-national units and at the 
finest industry echelon help clarify the actual influence of exchange rate volatility on trade.  
Yet, the lack of a comprehensive and fairly large set of bilateral trade data among provinces 
or, ideally, among smaller geographical units, represents a serious statistical constraint. It can, 
however, be bypassed by measuring volatility in a border effect framework. When employing such 
methodology, we obtain a description of the world “as if” we were allowed to directly compare intra-
national with international data. In so doing, border effect techniques enable us to take into 
consideration the whole range of possible values of exchange rate volatility, including permanent zero 
volatility (intra-national data).   
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Accordingly, border effect estimations carried out in a multi-country, multi-currency context 
reveal a strongly negative influence of volatility on trade, whereas traditional gravity specifications 
fail to identify this. Following this methodology we find a large and negative impact of volatility on 
relative imports and, once volatility is taken into account, we can reduce the border effect in Europe 
of 50 percent. 
Bilateral data, although geographically disaggregated, are still macroeconomic data and, as 
such, do not take into consideration the different nature of the markets in which trade occurs. One of 
the main conclusions of the extensive literature on exchange rate pass-through is that a sector’s 
market structure has an important effect on firms’ pricing behavior in international markets. The 
interplay of a multi-currency framework with industry-specific features such as the degree of 
industrial concentration and non-tariff barriers, the relative location of reference markets and 
competitors, the extent of vertical differentiation and the magnitude of economies of scale greatly 
influences the effects found at an aggregated international level. 
Empirical evidence reported in the chapter confirms the sensitivity of exchange rate volatility 
coefficients to differences in market structures and emphasises the benefits of using industry level 
data in empirical investigations. Industries featuring fragmented markets are greatly harmed, 
especially if the given industry has a homogeneous product. Similar problems arise in industries 
operating in segmented markets, but where the product is differentiated.  Volatility seems also to 
harm technology-based and scale-intensive industries as well as those characterised by mainstream 
production; mature, advertising intensive, products. 
Although empirical estimates based on disaggregated trade data can be very insightful, they 
also have some important drawbacks. The existence of zero observations (non observed commodity 
flows) between pairs of locations might lead to severe estimation caveats. Consequently, the higher 
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the level of disaggregation and the degree of industrial specialization are, the more problematic the 
estimation using formal panel regression models is likely to be. The risk of non-linearities and 
selection biases, implied by non-randomly missing and multiple zero observations, calls for ad hoc 
estimations procedures still under refinement. 
Improved data availability and continued effort to upgrade the techniques of measurement 
will help improve the estimation of the role played by currencies in favoring or hindering market 
integration. These will also help determining the extent to which they constitute a trade barrier or a 
cause of segmentation  
 56 
References 
Anderson, J. & van Wincoop E. , 2000. Gravity with Gravitas: a Solution to the Border Puzzle. 
NBER Working Paper No.w8079. 
Baier, S.L. & Bergstrand J.H. , 2001.  The Growth of World Trade: Tariffs, Transport Costs, and 
Income Similarity. Journal of International Economics, no.53 pp.1-27. 
Bergstrand, J. , 1985.  The Gravity Equation of International Trade. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 67(3) pp-474-481. 
Deardoff, A. V. , 1998. Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical 
World?  in: Frankel J. (ed.) The Regionalisation of World Economy. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Dell’Ariccia, G. , 1998. Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Trade Flows: Evidence from the 
European Union. IMF Working Paper WP/98/107. 
Dornbush, R. & Frankel, J. , 1988.  The Flexible Exchange Rate System: Experience and 
Alternatives  in S. Bornereditions (ed.) International Finance and Trade, International 
Economic Association and Mac Millan Press, London. 
Evans, C.L. , 1999. The Sources of Border Effect: Nationality or Location?  Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
Evans, C.L. , 2000. The Economic Significance of National Border Effects.  Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
Evenett S.  & Keller W. , 2002. On Theories Explaining the Success of the Gravity Equation  
Journal of Political Economy. 
European Commission , 1990.  One Market, One Money. European Economy. 
European Commission , 1995.  The Impact of Exchange Rate Movements on Trade within the 
Single Market. European Economy no. 4 
Flandreau M. & Maurel M. , 2001. Monetary Union, Trade Integration and Business Cycles in 
the 19th Century Europe: Just do it.  CEPR DP no. 3087. 
Frankel, J. , 1997.Regional  Trading Blocks, Institute for International Economics, Washington 
DC. 
Frankel, J. & Rose, A. , 2002. An Estimate of the Effect of Corrency Unions on Trade and 
Output. Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Head, K., 2001. Gravity for beginners. Unpublished. 
Head, K. & Mayer, T. , 2000. Non-Europe : The Magnitude and Causes of Market Fragmentation 
in the EU. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 136(2), pp 285-314. 
Heckman, J.J. , 1979.  Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.  Econometrica 47, 153-
161. 
 57 
Helliwell, J.F. , 1996.  Do National Boundaries Matter for Trade?  Canadian Journal of 
Economics 29, pp. 507-522. 
Helliwell, J.F. , 1997.  National Borders, Trade and Migration.  Pacific Economic Review 2:3, pp. 
165-185. 
Helliwell ,J.F. , 1998. How Much Do National Borders Matter?  The Brookings Institution. 
Helliwell, J.F. & McCallum, J. , 1995.  National Borders Still Matter for Trade.  Policy Options, 
16, pp. 44-48. 
Hillberry R. , 1999. Explaining the Border Effect: What Can We Learn from Disaggregated 
Commodity Flow Data?. WP no. 9802, Indiana University. 
Helpman E. & Krugman, P.  , 1985. Market Stucture and Foreign Trade. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Ma. 
Hooper, P. & Kohlhagen, S.  , 1978.  The Effect of Exchange Rate Uncertainty on the Prices and 
Volumes of International Trade. Journal of International Trade 8, pp 483-511 
IMF, 1984.  Exchange Rate Volatility and World Trade. IMF Occasional Paper 28 
Kenen, P.B. &  Rodrik, D. , 1986.  Measuring and Analyzing the Effects of Short-Term Volatility 
in Real Exchange Rates.  Review of Economics and Statistics 68(2), May 1986. 
Koray, F.  & Lastrapes, W.  , 1989.  Real Exchange Rate Volatility and US Bilateral Trade: a 
VAR Approach  The Review of Econmics and Statistics 71, pp. 708-712. 
Krugman, P. , 1989. Exchange Rate Instability. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Lastrapes, W. & Koray, F.  , 1990.  Exchange Rate Volatility and US Multilateral Trade Flows  
Journal of Macroeconomics 12, pp. 341-363. 
Leamer, E. , 1997.  Access to Western Markets , and Eastern Effort Levels  in S. Zecchini (ed.) 
Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
McCallum, J. , 1995.  National Borders Matter: Canada-US Regional Trade Patterns  American 
Economic Review, 85(3), pp. 615-623. 
Obstfeld, M. & Rogoff, K. , 2000. The Six Major Puzzles in International Economics: Is There a 
Common Cause?  NBER wp, no. 7777. 
Pugh, G., Tyrrall, D. and Tarnawa, L. , 1999. Exchange Rate Variability, International Trade and  
the Single Currency Debate: a Survey. Meeusen (ed.)  Economic Policy in the European 
Union: Current Perspectives (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar). 
Nitsch, V. , 2000. National Borders and International Trade: Evidence from the European Union    
Canadian Journal of Economics  
Rogoff, K. , 1996.  The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle  Journal of Economic Literature34(2), 
pp.647-668. 
Rose, A. , 2000. One Money, One Market: The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade.  
Economic Policy  0(30), April 2000, pages 7-33. 
 58 
Sercu, P. & Vanhulle, C. , 1992.  Exchange Rate Volatility, International Trade and the Value of 
Exporting Firms. Journal of Banking and Finance 16, pp. 155-82 
Wei, S-J. , 1996.  Intra-National Versus International Trade: How Stubborn Are Nations in 
Global Integration.  NBER Working Paper No. 5531. 
Wolf, H. C. , 1997. Patterns of Intra and Inter-State Trade, NBER Working Paper 5939. 
 59 
Annex 1.1: Exchange rate volatility by industry  
Industry 
NACE code Industry name
volatility 
coefficient
Industry 
NACE code Industry name
volatility 
coefficient
241 Clay -71.87 313 Metals transformation -23.24
423 Food n.e.s. -68.72 473 Printing -22.56
417 Pasta -64.76 373 Optical ins. -21.66
461 Wood-sawing -64.32 411 Oils and fats -21
428 Soft drinks -60.28 221 Iron and steel -20.44
351 Motor vehicles-ass & eng -59.9 314 Structural metal -20.29
244 Asbestos -58.39 316 Tools etc. -19.89
451 Footwear- mass -54.09 438 Floor coverings -19.32
346 Electrical apps.-domestic -54.07 312 Forging -19.24
362 Railway -52.44 347 Lighting eq. -18.81
352 Motor vehicles-bodies -52.13 247 Glass -18.55
251 Industrial chem. -46.7 453 Clothing -18.54
436 Knitting -45.5 466 Cork & brushes -18
353 Motor vehicles-parts -45.13 325 Machinery-engineering -17.65
242 Cement -45 257 Pharmaceuticals -17.57
326 Transmission eq. -44.68 321 Machinery- agricultural -16.73431
364 Aerospace -43.28 427 Beer -15.95
471 Pulp & paper -43.18 412 Meat -15.4
343 Electrical apps.-indl. -42.94 328 Machinery n.e.s -14.98
374 Clocks -42.93 481 Rubber -13.35
345 Receivers-TV & Radio -41.68 323 Machinery-textile -13.28
371 Precision ins. -40.23 248 Ceramics -12.66
419 Bread -40.14 439 Textile n.e.s -12.01
441 Leather-tanning -39.3 465 Wood n.e.s -9.91
467 Wooden furniture -39.04 494 Toys and sports -9.84
245 Stone -38.26 322 Machine-tools -7.43
223 Steel-preprocess -38.07
243 Concrete -37.72
324 Machinery-food & chem. -37.28 120 Coke ovens ns
246 Abrasives -36.74 152 Fissionable materials ns
327 Machinery-misc -35.08 224 Non-ferrous metals ns
341 Wires -35.07 255 Paint & Ink ns
495 Manufacturing n.e.s -34.81 256 Industrial chem. n.e.s ns
258 Soap -34.38 259 Household chem. n.e.s ns
429 Tobacco -33.54 365 Transport eq. n.e.s ns
483 Plastics -33.53 372 Medical eq. ns
420 Sugar -33.07 491 Jewellery ns
472 Paper processing -32.4 415 Fish ns
140 OIL REFINING -32.11 416 Grain milling ns
421 Confectionery -32.11 418 Starch ns
455 Textiles-households -32.03 424 Distilling ns
463 Carpentry -31.55 425 Wine ns
260 MAN-MADE FIBRES -31.36 456 Furs ns
442 Leather-products -31.11 464 Wooden containers ns
363 Cycles -30.88 482 Used tyres ns
414 Vegetables -29.85
422 Poultry -29.34
342 Electrical plant -25.88
462 Wood-processed -24.96 344 Telecoms 11.69
311 Foundries -23.95 492 Musical ins. 12.91
315 Metal containers -23.74 493 Graphic labs 13.04
222 Steel tubes -23.66 361 Shipbuilding 13.57
413 dairy -23.45 330 MACHINERY-OFFICE 17.63
Industries with positive and signif. volatility 
Industries with statistically non signif. volatility 
Industries ranked by coefficient for exchange rate volatility (1975-1990)
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Annex 1.2 : A comparison with Wei (1996) 
In the past, at least one other paper testing for home bias (Wei, 1996), has directly controlled for 
volatility. Wei tests two exchange rate volatility measures over aggregate, country level data: 
1) Direct bilateral volatility between trade partners, expected to have a trade depressing effect  
2) Average volatility for both importer and exporter9 to entertain the possibility of cross-currency 
volatility causing substitution among trading partners.  
The underlying assumption is that a rise in either exporter’s or importer’s average volatility, 
holding the volatility of the direct exchange rate constant, may increase the pair’s trade.  
Wei (1996) Our estimates 
Dataset covers 19 OECD countries Dataset covers 12 European countries i.e. the 12 members 
of the European Union before the last enlargement of 
1995 
Period  4 separate years: 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 Period 1976-1995 
Basic gravity model augmented with  
 remoteness 
 common border 
 adjacency 
 common language 
Gravity model explanatory variables are: 
 relative/non relative production 
 distance measure encompassing remoteness 
 bilateral exchange rate volatility 
 non-EU membership 
 common language 
Variables:  
 Bilateral trade  
 GDP 
 Population (to instrument GDP) 
 Distance: Greater circle distance between countries, 
within countries average distance is assumed to be 
0.5, i.e. (0.25*distance) between two international 
economic centers. 
 Remoteness: arithmetic weighted average of its 
distances from all trading partners with trading 
partners - incomes as weights      
 
Re tani h hi
h
mote w Dis ce
where wh is the  country 
h’s share in OECD total GDP. 
 Direct bilateral volatility between importing and 
exporting country  
 Average volatility for both importer and exporter  
Variables:  
 Bilateral imports (3-digit industry level) 
 Production (3-digit industry level) 
 Prices  
 Distance from Head and Mayer (2000): between 
two regions calculated as the weighted distance 
between the main city of each region, taking the 
longitude and latitude of each city and applying 
the greater circle formula. Internal distances are 
approximated to 0.376 the square root of the 
area according to the formula 
2 2 0.376
3 3ii
Ad R R
 
     
  
 
                                                   
9
 average volatility is defined as the average of volatility  of all the country’s bilateral exchange rates weighted by the 
partners’ GDP. 
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The volatility measures show positive and statistically significant signs. Furthermore, the 
estimated home bias appears to be only slightly affected. This is a cross sectional study estimating the 
home bias for 19 OECD countries in four separate years: 1982,1986, 1990 and 1994. We believe that  
this outcome may be affected by estimation bias due to omitted variables driving trade flows in the 
different countries for which this study does not control.  
Wei’s other findings are the following. At aggregate level, imports from self (i.e. a nations 
production less its exports) are 2.5 times more than from abroad. The welfare consequences of the 
observed home bias are rather small and a slow but steady decline of the border effect across years 
takes place. table 5 provides a synthetic comparison of the two studies. 
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Chapter 2 – Trade Effects of the euro: Evidence 
from Sectoral Data* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter contributes to the rapidly growing literature on the impact of Europe’s monetary union on trade, 
by proposing, for the first time, an analysis of sectoral data. As customary in the relevant literature, we 
empirically test a gravity-like model of trade, using a range of different specifications. We introduce both an 
exchange rate uncertainty term (proxied by two alternative measures: the variance of the nominal exchange 
rate return, VOL, and the absolute forecast premium, AFP) and an EMU dummy into our model. The results 
for both specifications lead us to conclude that the effect of exchange rate uncertainty is negative and large 
while the effect of the European Monetary Union on trade is positive and sizable for both intra and extra Euro-
area countries. We also find that exchange rate uncertainty and the EMU dummy are jointly significant leading 
us to suspect the existence of non-linearities in the relationship under study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: F12; F15; F17 
Keywords: EMU, Exchange rate volatility, trade, gravity, border, sector  
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1 Introduction 
Europe’s monetary union provides a unique opportunity to observe the trade effects of 
exchange rate regime changes. Among the many important effects, the trade impact has attracted a 
great deal of attention from policy makers and scholars. Monetary union involves costs and benefits, 
the most commonly identified cost being the loss of monetary policy as a national stabilisation tool, 
and the most commonly identified benefit being the increased trade and investment that monetary 
union might foster. In short, the ‘cons’ are macro and the ‘pros’ are micro. For example, the recent 
debates in the UK and Sweden over potential membership in the euro area frequently turned on the 
euro’s trade impact. At the heart of this discussion is the path-breaking empirical study, Rose (2000), 
which found that currency unions tended to hugely increase bilateral trade flows – by up to 400% 
according to some of his estimates. Rose (2000) attracted a multitude of comments and critiques – 
most suggesting that the Rose’s first estimates were too high. While Rose’s general point has passed 
the test – the profession is now willing to take serious the notion that currency unions do have a 
positive trade effect, at least in some situations – the applicability of the ’Rose effect’ work to the 
euro area remains in doubt. Most of the studies in this literature relied on evidence from currency 
unions between nations that were typically poor and very, very small economically. 
Fortunately, we now have enough data to begin directly testing for the Rose effect on euro 
area data. For example, a very recent paper, Micco et al. (2003), finds a statistically significant 
increase in euro area nations’ aggregate trade right from 1999, with their estimates suggesting a gain 
of between 5% and 20% depending upon the data sample and statistical technique. This is roughly in 
line with the findings of other similar studies that include Barr et al (2003), Bun and Klaassen (2002), 
and De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003). 
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This chapter adds a new element to the rapidly emerging literature on the euro’s trade impact.  
We use a fresh sectoral data set to test for the presence of a Rose effect at industry level. Specifically, 
we use bilateral import data for ISIC 2-digit and 3-digit manufacturing sectors for 18 industrialised 
countries. 
Our findings confirm that EMU, right from its announcement, has boosted trade in Europe. 
Our results hold both for a pool across countries and sectors, and for a pool only across countries, 
where we obtain sector specific estimates. 
The chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, we review the most relevant 
literature in Section 2 and present the model in Section  3 before turning to the results in Section 4. 
The final section presents our concluding remarks. 
2 Trade, exchange rate volatility and currency unions 
The literature distinguishes three types of exchange rate uncertainty: exchange rate 
misalignment, exchange rate volatility, and currency unions. While exchange rate misalignments – 
persistent departures of real exchange rates from their equilibrium values – have been conclusively 
shown to have a negative link with trade (see, inter alia, European Commission, 1995), empirical 
findings on the volatility-trade link are much more mixed. The currency-union-and-trade literature 
emerged only recently, but here again the empirical findings are mixed. Since the results on 
misalignment are clear and less relevant to our own work, we review only the volatility-trade studies 
in section 2.1 and the currency-union-trade studies in section 2.2. 
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2.1 Exchange rate uncertainty 
The trade effect of exchange rate uncertainty has been widely discussed theoretically and 
empirically at least since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.10 We turn 
first to the theory. 
2.1.1 Theoretical literature 
Theoretically, the volatility-trade relationship is ambiguous. The mainstay of the economic 
logic underpinning a negative link is the aversion of firms to engaging in a risky activity, namely 
trade. This was evident in the early post Bretton Woods literature (Clark (1973), Baron (1976a), 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978)).  
A second wave of papers, sparked by the dollar’s spectacular rise and fall in the 1980s, sought 
to account for the continual stream of negative results by modifying the assumption of risk aversion. 
Since standard profit-functions are convex in prices, removing risk aversion from firms’ objective 
function directly led to theoretical predictions of an insignificant, or even positive relationship 
between volatility and trade (see De Grauwe (1988) and Gros (1987)). A second line of models 
removed the presumption that exchange rate uncertainty would hamper trade risk by showing that 
hedging possibilities could lead risk averse firms to act in ways that made them seem risk neutral (see 
Ethier (1973) and Baron (1976b), Viaene and de Vries (1992)). A third line of papers argued that the 
inability to find a negative volatility-trade link stemmed from the fact that exchange rate risk was 
small relative to other risks incurred by exporter (see Grauwe (2000), Gros (1987), Broll and Eckwert 
(1999), Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998)). A very different line of models studied the behaviour of risk 
neutral firms facing a sunk market-entry cost (see Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), 
                                                   
10
 For more extended literature reviews about the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade, see IMF (1984), Côté (1994), 
McKenzie (1999), Skudelny (2002) and Taglioni (2002). 
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Dixit (1989), Krugman (1989), Franke (1991), Sercu and Vanhulle (1992)). These models introduced 
the possibility of trade hysteresis and, depending upon modelling details, could predict a negative, 
positive and no effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade. 
2.1.2 Empirical literature 
Given the importance of the topic and the ready availability of the necessary data, it is not surprising 
to find a huge number of empirical studies on the volatility-trade link. For analytic purposes, it is 
useful to classify the studies according to the type of data used, namely times series, cross-section, or 
panel. A summary of all the studies are presented in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2. Most studies employed 
time series techniques and found no significant relationship between volatility and trade. The few that 
found a link, suggested that the effect was very small (see Koray and Lastrapes (1989), Bélanger and 
Gutierrez (1988), Bini-Smaghi (1991), Kenen and Rodrik (1986) and Sekkat (1998). 
More recently, some studies implemented co-integration analysis, as for example Arize 
(1997, 1998a and b), Fountas and Aristotelous (1999) and Koray and Lastrapes (1989). An empirical 
review of this strand of literature is reported in Flam and Jansson (2000). The results of the studies 
taking into consideration the trend characteristics of the time-series appear to be more clear-cut; most 
suggest a significant negative effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the trade variables. However, at 
least three studies employing the above-mentioned techniques, among which the one from Flam and 
Jansson (2000), report significantly positive or mixed results11. Moreover, the choice between OLS 
regressions and co-integration analysis depends on the stationarity properties of the trade variable and 
of the proxy for exchange rate uncertainty. 
 
                                                   
11
 Flam and Jansson find that the long run relations between exchange rate volatility and exports are mostly negative and in 
several cases insignificantly different from zero. McKenzie (1998) analyses Australian imports and exports at the sectoral 
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Table 2-1: Empirical literature using time series techniques 
Authors1) Period Region2) Proxy for uncertainty3) Dependent 
variable4) 
Results5) 
Time series studies      
Arize (1997) 73-92 G7 Moving average  [RER] X all var I(1) and 
co-int 
Arize (1998a) 73-93 US Moving average  [RER] M all var I(1) and 
co-int 
Arize (1998b) 73-95 BL, DK, FI, 
FR, GR, NL, 
SP and SD 
 [REER] from predicted value 
(fitting 4th order auto-regressive 
process) 
M all var I(1) and 
co-int 
Bailey and Tavlas (1988) 75-86 US abs [REERR] 
 [REER] and  [FEER] 
Aggr. X n.s. 
Bélanger and Gutierrez (1988) 76-87 CAN-US squared forcast error X, 5 sectors s. neg. in 2 
sectors 
Bini-Smaghi (1991) 76-84 GE, FR, IT, 
intra EMS 
VEERR X s. neg. 
Cushman (1988) 74-83 US MA  [RERR] 
E[RER] 
E [FER] 
Bil. X s./n.s., 
pos./neg. 
Fountas and Aristotelous (1998) 73-96 FR, GE, IT, 
UK 
MA  [NEERR] 
Dummy ERM 
Bil. X  [NEERR] 
mostly s. neg.  
Dummy n.s. 
Gagnon (1993) 60-88 US based on regression of the RER Bil. X n.s. 
Kenen and Rodrik (1986) 75-84 11 indus  [RERR] 
different forecast errors 
M s. neg. 
Klaassen (2000) 78-96 US-G7 MA VNERR Bil. X Mostly n.s. 
Koray and Lastrapes (1989) 61-71, 75-
85 
US-UK, GE, 
FR, JP, CAN 
VRERR Bil. M s. neg. (small) 
Kumar (1992) 62-88 US, GE, JP  (RERR) Intra-industry 
X+M 
Mixed 
Lastrapes and Koray (1990) 75-87 US VRERR and VNERR Aggr. X and M s. neg. (weak) 
McKenzie (1998) 69-95 AUS ARCH X 
M 
Mixed results 
McKenzie and Brocks (1997) 73-92 GE-US ARCH X 
M 
s. pos. 
Perée and Steinherr (1989) 60-85 US, JP, UK, 
GE, BL 
LT uncertainty Aggr. and bil. X Aggr n.s., often s. 
neg. in bil equ 
Sekkat (1998) 75-94 FR, IT, GE, 
UK and BL)  
 [NERR] 
misalignment 
X vol and P 
3SLS, ECM 
ERV has ST 
effect, 
misalignment LT 
effect 
1)
 A star designates authors using gravity type trade models 
2)
 indus: industrialised countries; WT: world trade (trade from different regions, sample depending on data available). 
3)
 (V)N(R)E(E)R(R): (variance of the) nominal (real) (effective) exchange rate (return); MA: moving average;  : standard deviation 
4)
 M: imports, X: exports, : variable in first difference 
5)
 (n.)s.: coefficient on the exchange rate uncertainty term is (non-)significantly different from zero at 5%. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
level and obtains mixed results. Daly (1998) analyses bilateral trade between Japan and seven other industrialised 
countries, finding significantly positive results for seven import and five export flows out of fourteen.  
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 Cross sectional studies were more likely to find a link, but again the effect was in most cases 
relatively small (see Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978), De Grauwe (1987), Brada and Méndez (1988), 
De Grauwe and Verfaille (1988), Savvides (1992), Frankel and Wei (1993), Sapir et al. (1994) and 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995)). 
 
Table 2-2: Empirical literature using cross-section techniques 
Cross-sectional analysis      
Brada and Méndez (1988)* 73-77 WT dummy ER regime Bil. X Effect float pos. 
De Grauwe (1987) 73-84 EU  [R(N)ERR] Bil. X s. neg. 
De Grauwe and Verfaille (1988) 79-85 15 indus VRERR Bil. X Trade in EMS > 
outside EMS 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995)* 30s WT VNERR X s. neg., small 
Frankel and Wei (1993)* 80, 85, 90 WT  [N(R)ERR] Bil. trade s. neg. in 80, s. 
pos. in 90, small 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) 65-75 6 indus  NER 
 (FER) 
abs[FER(-1)-NER] 
X prices and 
volumes 
P: s. neg. 
Vol: n.s. 
Sapir et al. (1994) 73-92 GE-EC 
GE-non EC 
NERR Bil. M s. neg. , small 
Savvides (1992) 73-86 WT  (REERR) X only 
unanticipated 
RER vol. s. neg.  
Wei (1999)* 75, 80, 85, 
90 
63 countries  [N(R)ERR] 
Dummy hedging instruments 
Bil. trade s. neg. 
dummy ns 
1)
 A star designates authors using gravity type trade models 
2)
 indus: industrialised countries; WT: world trade (trade from different regions, sample depending on data available). 
3)
 (V)N(R)E(E)R(R): (variance of the) nominal (real) (effective) exchange rate (return); MA: moving average;  : standard deviation 
4)
 M: imports, X: exports, : variable in first difference 
5)
 (n.)s.: coefficient on the exchange rate uncertainty term is (non-)significantly different from zero at 5%. 
 
The reason for this difference in using a cross sectional or a time series analysis relies in the 
fact that a volatility term in a time series analysis may capture the volatility of other variables in the 
model. The effect of the latter might differ from what we expect from exchange rate volatility, so that 
the total outcome is uncertain. The problem of cross sectional studies is that their outcome may be 
heavily dependent on the selected countries. A heterogeneous sample of industrial and less developed 
countries could lead to an estimation bias due to omitted variables driving trade flows in the different 
countries. The only practical solution to these shortcomings was to use fixed-effects estimators on 
panel data.  
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Studies that used panel data and estimation methods find a significant and negative effect 
exchange rate uncertainty on the volume of trade, with the magnitude of the impact being quite large; 
reaching levels of around 10% in the long run. (See Abrams (1980), Thursby and Thursby (1987), 
Dell’Ariccia (1998), Pugh et al. (1999), Rose (1999), De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000) and Anderton 
and Skudelny (2001) who all use panel data econometrics 
Table 2-3: Empirical literature using panel techniques 
Panel techniques      
Abrams (1980)* 73-76 19 indus VNER and VNERR Bil X s. neg. 
Anderton and Skudelny (2001) 89-99 EMU VNERR Bil M s. neg. 
De Grauwe and Skudelny 
(2000) 
61-95 EU VNERR Bil. X s. neg. 
Dell’Ariccia (1998)* 75-94 Western 
Europe 
 [ERR] 
abs [FER(-1)-NER] 
max[NER]/min[NER] 
X+M s. neg.; 
strong effect (ca 
10-12%) 
Pugh et al. (1999)* 80-92 16 OECD  [NERR] M 
demand 
growth; 
X (level) 
s. neg. , big; 
bigger for non-
ERM countries 
Rose (2000)* 70, 75, 80, 
85, 90 
WT MA  [NERR] 
MA max[abs(NERR)] 
MA 90th percentile univariate distribution 
of ERR 
MA  [ER] 
 [ERR] 
dummy for currency union 
X vol: s. neg. ; 
CU: s. pos.  
big effect of both 
Thursby and Thursby (1987)* 74-82 17 indus VNER around predicted trend Bil. X s. neg. 
1)
 A star designates authors using gravity type trade models 
2)
 indus: industrialised countries; WT: world trade (trade from different regions, sample depending on data available). 
3)
 (V)N(R)E(E)R(R): (variance of the) nominal (real) (effective) exchange rate (return); MA: moving average;  : standard deviation 
4)
 M: imports, X: exports, : variable in first difference 
5)
 (n.)s.: coefficient on the exchange rate uncertainty term is (non-)significantly different from zero at 5%. 
 
In summary, there seems to be a clear superiority of panel techniques in a situation involving 
substantial cross-nation variation in unobserved variables as well as substantial time-series variation. 
Therefore, the profession has progressively come to downgrade the importance of the slew of non-
findings in the early literature. The empirical assertion that uncertainty reduces trade in a first-order 
manner should hence be taken seriously. The remaining question is by how much uncertainty reduces 
trade.  
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2.2 Currency unions and trade 
While the theoretical literature linking exchange rate volatility and trade volumes has 
proliferated since the breakdown of Bretton Woods in early 1970s, there seems to be no formal model 
of how a currency union could boost bilateral trade volumes in a discrete fashion. A good deal of 
informal theorising can be found in the background studies to the European Commission’s well-
known “One Market, One Money” study (EC 1990), in particular Baldwin (1991). Moreover, almost 
all the empirical papers on the effect of monetary unions on trade, a new strand of research started 
with Rose (2000), contain a few paragraphs of conjecture on how a currency union might boost trade. 
A related noteworthy aspect of the theoretical literature combines modern trade and exchange rate 
models to examine the two-way interaction between trade pricing and exchange rate volatility. The 
results of the first formal models by Baldwin and Lyons (1993, 1994) have recently been reproduced 
and extended by Devereux and Engel (2002) and by Borda and Romalis (2003).  
On the empirical front, Rose (2000) started the debate on the effect of monetary unions on 
trade by finding that countries participating in a currency union seemed to trade three times more than 
expected – even when one controlled for the impact of exchange rate volatility. In his seminal paper, 
Rose (2000) uses a gravity model of trade flows for a panel over five year intervals spanning 1970 to 
1990 for 186 countries, dependencies, territories, overseas departments, colonies, etc. On top of the 
standard variables for a gravity model, he introduces a volatility measure and a dummy variable for 
trading partners using the same currency (330 in his sample of 31000 observations in total). Rose 
(2000) finds a significant positive effect for this dummy with a coefficient of 1.21, implying that 
countries within a currency union traded 2.3 times more with the other members of the currency 
union than with third countries. Rose conducts some sensitivity analysis, excluding some countries, 
changing the measurement of monetary regime (the currency union dummy), using alternative 
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measures for distance and adding possible omitted variables, and always finds a significant and 
substantial effect. 
Several studies have built upon this framework and provide support for the thesis of Rose 
(2000) pointing to a very substantial effect of a currency union on trade flows. Rose and van Wincoop 
(2001) control for the effect of multilateral trade resistance. Rose and Engel (2002) construct a 
gravity model with similar control variables as Rose (2000), but use a cross sectional approach, with a 
sample of 150 countries (or territories, etc.) in the year 1995, and do not have, among the explanatory 
variables, a proxy for exchange rate volatility. The study of Glick and Rose (2001) is based on a panel 
of 217 countries (or territories, etc.) with annual observations from 1948 to 1997. The estimation is 
based on a gravity equation as in Rose (2000), excluding however the volatility variable. Moreover, 
Glick and Rose (2002) use the random effects, the fixed effects, the between and the maximum 
likelihood estimators for panel data. Nitsch (2002) makes the following main changes to the estimates 
of Rose (2000), thereby entailing significant changes in the coefficient of the currency union dummy: 
First, he uses cross-sectional estimates over 5 years rather than pooling the data across time and 
country pairings. Second, he corrects the data set which apparently contained some mis-
classifications. It then introduces different language dummies, and separate dummies for each 
currency. Finally, it uses a regression method correcting for the missing observations of Rose’s 
sample. Persson (2001) argues that non-linearity of the relationship might partly explain the 
surprisingly large results for the currency union dummy found by Rose (1999). The reply by Rose 
(2001) includes a new set of consistency checks and suggests that countries participating in currency 
unions trade 1.1 times more than other countries. In his reply, Rose is cautions against the 
applicability of his finding to the EMU, because most countries within currency unions in his sample 
are “small, poor or both, unlike most of the Euro-11.” Honohan (2001) argues that the sample of Rose 
covers mostly colonial countries. For this sort of countries the currency dummy measures rather 
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whether the abolition of a common currency reduces trade, so that no inference can be made 
regarding the effect of the creation of a monetary union, as for example EMU. 
Although the modifications to the original empirical results are quite substantial, the general 
finding is that countries belonging to the same currency union trade substantially more with each 
other.  
Micco et al. (2003) analyse the impact of a currency union on trade flows for the specific case 
of EMU. They use data for 22 industrial countries including the EMU countries and introduce, on top 
of the standard variables a dummy for membership in EMU. Their estimates suggest a gain of 
between 5% and 20% depending upon the data sample and statistical technique. Barr et al. (2003) 
estimate a gravity model for European countries, including both EMU and non-EMU countries. Their 
estimates for the period 1978 to 2002 indicate the currency union effect amounts to 29%. They also 
control for exchange rate volatility and find a trade reduction through exchange rate volatility by 
12%. 
With this review of the literature in hand, we turn to theoretical considerations that should 
help guide our empirical work in the following sections. 
3 Methodology, Data Sources and Measures 
3.1 The model 
Our empirical work is based on a gravity model similar to the one used in Rose (2000) and 
most subsequent studies. The basic idea of the gravity is based on Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
Given CES preferences over domestic and imported varieties, the demand for a single imported 
variety is: 
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Equation 3-1 
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where xod(j) is the exports from the ‘origin’ nation to the ‘destination’ nation of variety ‘j’, ‘ED’ is the 
destination nation’s expenditure on imports, and ‘PD’ is the destination nation’s price index of goods 
that are substitutable with xod;  is the elasticity of substitution among all varieties, and, under Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition, it is the demand elasticity facing exporters. The total volume of 
bilateral exports is just the number of varieties exported from origin nation ‘o’ to destination nation 
‘d’ times the import level per variety, that is: 
Equation 3-2 
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where the second expression shows the assumption that the range of varieties available in nation ‘o’ is 
proportional to the size of ‘o’ endowment of factors, L. Here we have imposed symmetry on all 
nation-o made varieties.  
Furthermore, we assume that the price of a typical variety varies with man-made trade 
barriers, with a distance related cost of trade, and with the unit factor cost in nation ‘o’. Thus, 
imposing: 
Equation 3-3 
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where ‘
’ is the constant elasticity of trade costs with respect to bilateral distance, ‘’ reflects all 
bilateral, man-made trade barriers, ‘wo’ is the origin nation’s factor cost and ‘ao’ reflects its factor 
productivity level.  
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Assuming either factor price equalisation and a common technology, or different technology 
and a proportionality between factor rewards and factor productivity (i.e. wages are higher in highly 
productive nations in a way such that ‘wiai’ is fairly constant across nations), we can write the 
aggregate bilateral exports as: 
Equation 3-4 
DOododDoood ELDPawX
          )()()()( 1  
where the constancy of ‘wa’ across partnerships permits us to eliminate the subscripts.  
Taking logs we have: 
Equation 3-5 
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where the last two terms are the standard gravity factors, i.e. product of size variables, and bilateral 
distance. The other terms reflect an exporter specific term ‘Co’, an importer specific term ‘Cd’ – these 
are sometimes called the remoteness factor or multilateral trade resistance – and bilateral trade 
barriers ‘Cod’ that reflect expected risk and includes some well known bilateral trade barriers –
modelled with dummies such as common membership in the EU, and membership in the euro area. 
Section 3.3.on exchange rate uncertainty will provide an account of how expected risk is measured.     
 
Most estimates of the gravity model use aggregate trade flows as the dependent variable so it 
is reasonable to take aggregate size measures as proxies for L and E. The usual practice is to take the 
two nations’ real GDPs, under the assumption that the importer’s expenditure will be proportional to 
its GDP and the range of products available in the exporting nation will be proportional to its GDP. 
When using sectoral trade data, however, the mapping between L and E and GDPs is less 
clear. On the importer’s side, one can think of using the corresponding sector’s gross value added. 
However, the import-demand for, say, chemicals arises from many sectors other than the chemicals 
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sector. On the export side, one can think of using sectoral production as a proxy for the number of 
varieties, but sector production data is difficult to get for long time periods and a broad sample of 
countries. Moreover, such sectoral value added measures are typically fraught with many 
measurement problems.  
We experimented however with the value added per sector, deflated with overall 
manufacturing producer prices (for the reason explained above). For the importer, we took apparent 
consumption, which is equal to the value added of the sector, minus exports plus imports. Second, we 
used real GDP of the exporter and the importer. This has the inconvenient vis-à-vis the value added 
specification, that the income variable is the same across all the sectors, so that the regression does 
not contain any sector variant variable any more (except for the dependent variable). However, when 
we do not pool across sectors, the variable coefficient on the income variables should help circumvent 
this problem. The advantage of using the GDP is that we have a complete dataset, while for the value 
added and the apparent consumption we have many missing observations. 
The distance, as usual, is measured as the great circle distance between national capitals. 
Furthermore, we define an EU-dummy which is equal to unit when both trading partners are member 
of the EU, and two EMU dummies; one, which is equal to unit if and when both partners are 
members of EMU (EMU2), and one which is equal to unit if and when only one of the two partners is 
in EMU. 
3.2 A first look at unconditional trade growth 
In our estimations, we use sectoral, bilateral import data on ISIC Rev.3 2-digit and 3-digit 
manufacturing sectors for the euro area of 12 nations, the 3 non-euro area EU members as well as 
Australia, Canada, Norway, Japan and the US (the choice of countries was guided by data 
availability: note that the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union does not report separate data for the 
two nations, and that Ireland is excluded due to some data shortages, so there are only 10 trade 
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partners in the euro area of 12 countries). The exact sectors used for the regressions are reported in 
the annex.  
Trade (import) data are from the OECD Bilateral Trade Database, deflated using 
manufacturing producer prices. Although it would be more appropriate to use the import prices from 
each individual sector used in the regressions, the limited data availability for import or producer 
prices for our sample and sector breakdown obliged us to use overall manufacturing producer prices. 
12
  
Bilateral trade flows are significantly affected by income fluctuations and growth in EU 
nations has varied substantially in recent years. This, of course, is why we control for GDP in the 
regressions, but before turning to the formal statistical analysis, it is interesting to eyeball the raw 
trade flows.  
To reduce the data a manageable dimension we group our raw data into broader SITC 
classifications: Chemicals and related products (sector 5), Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material (sector 6), Machinery and transport equipment (sector 7) and Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (sector 8).  
3.2.1 Composition of bilateral trade flows 
In Chart 3-1, we calculate the percentage of each of these sectors in total manufacturing trade 
for intra-euro area exports (ININ), exports from intra- to extra-euro area countries (INEX), exports 
from extra- to intra-euro area countries (EXIN) and trade between extra-euro area countries (EXEX). 
For all four groupings according to the direction of the trade flows, sector 7 (machinery and transport 
equipment) represents the largest share with about 50 or more percent. Intra-euro area countries 
export more of sector 6 goods (manufactured goods classified chiefly by material) to both 
destinations than extra-euro area countries.  
                                                   
12
 Unit value indices are available only for a 2-digits breakdown and only for EU countries. 
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Chart 3-1: Percentage of each 1-digit sector in total intra- and extra-euro area exports 
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The shares differ however quite a lot between the individual countries. In particular, Greece is 
an exception to the relatively big size of sector 7 (machinery and transport equipment) (only 7% of 
the total), while the sector represents almost 80% of Japan’s total manufacturing exports, a share 
which is significantly higher than in the euro area. The share of sector 8 (Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles) is particularly high for Italy, Portugal, Denmark and Greece while it is very small for 
Finland, Norway, Japan and Canada. This is mainly related to the sectors ‘clothing’ and ‘footwear’, 
and partly also to the sector ‘furniture’. Exports in sectors 5 (Chemicals and related products) and 6 
(Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material) differ substantially between the different 
countries, with the biggest share in Ireland (35%) and the smallest share in Portugal and Japan (5%) 
for sector 5, and with the biggest share in Finland and Norway (48 and 47% respectively) and the 
smallest share in Ireland (5%) for sector 6. 
Chart 3-2 shows the development over time of intra- and extra-euro area exports in the four 
above-mentioned sectors. From this graph we can see that the euro area’s exports to non euro area 
nations have grown faster than intra-group trade over the past decade (the gap is negative). Moreover, 
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there does seem to have been a large change between 2000 and 2001, with this movement especially 
remarkable in the largest sector – machinery and transport equipment. The other sectors show a 
similar up tick, but it is noticeably more muted, especially for the miscellaneous category.  
 
Chart 3-2: Euro area’s intra- and extra-euro area nominal trade by sector 
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Regarding individual countries, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain have faster 
intra- than extra-euro area trade growth, while for the other countries there is no convincing evidence 
for stronger intra- than extra-euro area trade growth. In particular for Austria and Belgium, extra-euro 
area trade increased substantially more than intra-trade in most sectors. While for Austria, this might 
be explained by the relatively high share of trade to Eastern European countries, it is more surprising 
for Belgium. For Austria, the stronger increase in extra-trade comes mainly from organic and 
inorganic chemicals as well as from pharmaceutical products, together with power generating 
machinery and equipment, office machines, telecommunications and road vehicles. For the two latter 
sectors, intra-euro area trade also grew less rapidly than extra trade in Belgium. For Belgium, extra-
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trade increased stronger than intra-trade mainly from around 1995 onwards for sectors 7 and 8 
(mainly for telecommunications and road vehicles, and for sanitary, plumbing and lighting fixtures, 
furniture, clothing and footwear). Summarising the analysis above, it appears that there are substantial 
differences in trade exposure across the countries examined here, which can be relevant for their 
reaction to exchange rate risk and to the effect of currency union on their trade. In particular, sectors 
in which domestic production of the euro area and international trade are substitutable are obviously 
reacting stronger to exchange rate changes than those where the country is largely depending on 
imports from outside the euro area. 
3.3 Exchange rate uncertainty 
The argument to include exchange rate volatility into the model is that the expected risk might 
reduce exports, as reflected in the variable ‘Cod’ in Equation 3.5 . In our model, we use two different 
definitions of exchange rate uncertainty, one backward and one forward looking: the first, backward 
looking,  is defined as the annual variance of the weekly nominal exchange rate return: 
Equation 3-6 
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where ‘Sij’ is the nominal exchange rate between currencies ‘i’ and ‘j’, and the subscript w is the 
week. This measure is calculated for each country pairing for which the bilateral trade flows are 
analysed. 
As it is the expected risk that matters, we experiment with different moving averages of 
exchange rate volatility over the past, arguing that past exchange rate volatility should influence the 
expectation about future exchange rate volatility. 
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The second measure for exchange rate uncertainty is based on forward rates. It is defined as 
the annual average of the weekly growth rates of bilateral forward premium / discount rates in 
absolute values: 
Equation 3-7 
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where AFP is the absolute forward premium, and FP is the bilateral forward premium (converted into 
USD). 
This measure has the advantage that it reflects the expectations on the exchange rate 
developments between the period when the contract for exports is concluded and the period when the 
exports have to be paid. Moreover, it takes into account that the exporter might cover the risk on the 
foreign exchange market.  
Chart 3-3 shows the average intra- and extra-euro area exchange rate uncertainty for all euro 
area countries, using both definitions of uncertainty (VOL and AFP). As expected, intra-volatility is 
lower than extra-volatility, with a widening of this gap from around 1997 onwards due to the 
perspective of the creation of EMU in 1999. The chart also depicts the 1992-1994 crises in the ERM, 
with an effect on intra- and on extra-euro area exchange rate volatility.  An interesting feature is that 
the absolute forecast premium seems to react with some lag to strong exchange rate movements, as 
for example in the 1992-1994 crisis in the ERM. 
 
 
 83 
Chart 3-3:  Intra- and extra-euro area volatiliy 
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Source: BIS and own calculations 
ININ (INEX): intra- (extra-)euro area exchange rate uncertainty; VOL is the annual variance of the weekly nominal 
exchange rate return as defined above, multiplied with 100 (to make it comparable with the AFP). AFP is the absolute 
forecast premium.  
 
4 Empirical results 
We estimate the basic model on the pooled data set, and on each sector’s data alone.  
4.1 The pooled results 
We perform least square estimations of equation 3-5 on a pool of non-overlapping sectoral 
and country data, allowing for exporter and importer fixed effects along with industry fixed effects.13 
While in the above discussion we presented the model in terms of exports from ‘origin’ to 
‘destination’ nation, in the empirical tests we use import rather than export data due to data 
                                                   
13
 See the Data Annex for a list of sectors; in the pooled regressions redundant sectors and ‘not elsewhere classified’ (nec) 
sectors were excluded; the former to avoid using the same data twice and the latter because the ‘nec’ sectors include 
relatively heterogeneous goods. 
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availability and reliability.14 This should not affect the results, as exports from ‘origin’ to ‘destination’ 
are, from a theoretical point of view, equal to imports of ‘destination’ from ‘origin’.  
A first set of estimation results is reported in Table 4-1.   To control for the effect of EMU, we 
estimate the equation with a dummy, which is equal to one when the importer and the exporter are 
both members of EMU, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we add a dummy, which is equal to one if 
only one of the partners is member of EMU. This dummy measures trade diversion or creation effect 
with respect to third countries. Following Micco et al. (2003) we call the first dummy EMU2 and the 
second dummy EMU1.  
The specifications in Table 4-1 differ according to the choice of dummy variables and 
uncertainty proxy used. Specifications (1) and (2) only test for EMU2 while specifications (3) and (4) 
test both for EMU2 and EMU1. Furthermore specifications (1) and (3) measure uncertainty as 5 years 
moving average and  specifications (2) and (4) by means of the Absolute Forward Premium (AFP). 
Table 4-1: Pooled regression results 
EMU2 (Both trade partners in EMU) 0.72 11.51 *** 0.53 8.37 *** 0.75 11.86 *** 0.57 8.84 ***
EMU1 (Only one  trade partner in EMU) 0.14 3.24 *** 0.17 4.10 ***
(Value Added)i*(Apparent Consumption)j 0.49 26.16 *** 0.49 25.96 *** 0.49 25.66 *** 0.48 25.37 ***
(Producer Prices)i*(Producer Prices)j 0.31 13.94 *** 0.32 14.49 *** 0.31 14.20 0.33 14.84 ***
EU Membership 2.86 53.97 *** 2.88 54.84 *** 2.86 53.78 *** 2.87 54.57 ***
Volatility (5 years moving average) -19.66 -13.06 *** -19.36 -12.84 ***
AFP -0.38 -20.38 *** -0.39 -20.39 ***
Constant -14.15 -19.83 *** -13.95 -19.64 *** -14.19 -19.88 *** -13.98 -19.68 ***
Rose Effect of EMU2 106% 70% 112% 76%
     5%-confidence interval 82-132% 50-93% 87-140% 55-100%
Rose Effect of EMU1 15% 19%
     5%-confidence interval 6-25% 10-30%
 Number of observations 34892 34892 34892 34892
 Adj R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
 Root MSE      2.74 2.67 2.67 2.73
EMU trade creation and trade diversion effects (1991-2002) - pooled data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
                                                   
14
 Import data are found be more reliable than exports due the incentive for the exporter to underreport exports for tax 
purposes. 
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Note: The Rose effect is defined as [exp(MU dummy coeff.) – 1]; it shows the trade increase, in percentage terms,  due to 
monetary union. The 5% interval is calculated in the following way: the standard error of the coefficient is multiplied with the 
critical value at 2.5% (1.96) and subtracted for the lower bound and added for the upper bound of the confidence interval. 
 
All coefficients of the pooled regression have the expected sign and are roughly of the right 
magnitude. Producer prices are included in the specifications with value added and with gross 
production per sector, following the model of Head and Mayer (2000). The income and size variables 
have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant. The “EU membership” dummy is also 
positive and significant. According to the estimations, members of the EU trade 16-17% more with 
each other than it would be the case if one, or both, trade partners were not members.  
4.1.1 Exchange rate uncertainty and volatility 
Regarding exchange rate uncertainty, the five year moving average of the variance term 
(VOL) and the 6-month absolute forward premium (AFP) where chosen on the basis of their adjusted 
R-squared values . The trade reduction through exchange rate uncertainty amounts to 28% when 
using VOL as proxy, and to 38% when using AFP. An interesting feature is that the reduction in trade 
is significantly lower for the euro area countries, as they have historically relatively low exchange 
rate uncertainty. According to our estimation results, the intra-euro area trade reduction through 
exchange rate uncertainty amounts to 7% with VOL and 20% with AFP. 
4.1.2 Estimates of the “Rose effect” 
Our estimate of the monetary union’s impact on intra-euro area trade – that we call the ‘Rose 
effect’  varies between 70% and 112% The effect is lower when using AFP as a proxy for exchange 
rate uncertainty, indicating that this variable is a better proxy for uncertainty than VOL. As explained 
above, the effect of AFP on bilateral trade flows is stronger than that of VOL. Taking these two 
findings together, the overall effect of EMU – which can be calculated by adding the above EMU 
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effect from the dummy to the effect when setting the exchange rate uncertainty to zero – would vary 
between 91 and 119%.  
Table 4-1 also shows the 5%-confidence interval of the EMU-effect, which is calculated in 
the following way: the standard error of the coefficient is multiplied with the critical value at 2.5% 
(1.96) and subtracted for the lower bound and added for the upper bound of the confidence interval. 
The intervals are very large, showing that the point estimates of the EMU effect should be treated 
with caution. In particular, the difference between the lower and the upper bound amounts to roughly 
50% in all specifications. This finding is not surprising for a dummy variable, and can be made in 
many other studies on the so-called ‘Rose’ effect. It shows how carefully the results need to be 
interpreted.  
4.1.3 Trade with non-Eurozone nations 
Interestingly, the third country dummy (EMU1) seems to indicate that there is no trade 
diversion, but rather some trade creation through EMU between participating and non-participating 
countries, which ranges between 15 and 19%.  
This result is intriguing. If one could model the trade-reducing effects of volatility as a 
frictional trade barrier, the one-sided dummy should have been negative. The euro would have been 
akin to a discriminatory liberalisation and this should have reduced the exports of non-euro nations to 
the Euro area.  
One informal explanation of such results concerns the impact of the euro on the cost of 
exchanging currencies. The Euro area did not become a currency union until 2001, so intra- Euro area 
trade still involved foreign exchange transactions. It is possible, however, that the elimination of 
exchange rate risk lowered the cost of these transaction. The point is that any volatility, indeed even 
the possibility of volatility, makes foreign exchange trading riskier for the market makers.  
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Another possible explanation for this result is that the introduction of the Euro coincided with its 
weakness vis-à-vis the US Dollar and other currencies and this boosted all types of trade. 
4.1.4 About the volatility-trade link 
Most notable is the fact that the exchange rate uncertainty and the monetary union dummies 
are jointly significant indicating that the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows might be 
non-linear. 
Suppose the true relationship between volatility and trade is convex, as illustrated by the solid 
curve in Figure 4-1. An empirical model that assumed a linear link between volatility and trade (as 
illustrated by the dashed line), but also allowed a dummy for monetary union (i.e. zero volatility), 
would estimate the dummy to be positive and significant. Importantly, if the link were sufficiently 
convex, then adding a finite number of higher order volatility terms to the regression would not be 
enough. There would still be room for a significant currency dummy.  
Figure 4-1: Convexity of the volume-volatility link 
volatility
Units of Trade
 
Hence according to our empirical results, the linear volatility term predicts a steady rise in the 
log volume of trade; the dummy, which equals one when both nations use the euro, predicts a jump in 
trade just as volatility reaches zero. 
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We can however imagine that data can also be characterized by alternative forms of non-
linearity that are much smoother – forms that resemble the continuous line in figure 4-1, if the non-
linearity is convex. The precise form of the non-linearity will depend upon functional forms, so we 
cannot make a robust prediction as to the exact form. It is well known, however, that any continuous 
function, y=f(x), can be well approximated by a polynomial in x of a sufficiently high order. Using 
this result, we test for a smoother form of non-linearity in the trade-volatility link by introducing a 
squared volatility term in addition to the linear term.  
Table 4-2: Detecting non-linearities in the trade-volatility link 
EMU2 (Both trade partners in EMU) 0.57 8.87 *** 0.17 2.31 ** 0.60 9.38 *** 0.20 2.67 ***
EMU1 (Only one  trade partner in EMU) 0.21 4.80 *** 0.20 4.74 ***
(Value Added)i*(Apparent Consumption)j 0.49 26.25 *** 0.48 25.89 *** 0.48 25.59 *** 0.48 25.22 ***
(Producer Prices)i*(Producer Prices)j 0.31 13.99 *** 0.32 14.54 *** 0.32 14.41 0.33 14.94 ***
EU Membership 2.77 51.82 *** 2.82 53.21 *** 2.76 51.44 *** 2.81 52.84 ***
Volatility (5 years moving average) -61.54 -16.45 *** -63.16 -16.82 ***
Vol^2 (5 years moving average) 51083.18 12.22 *** 53596.67 12.73 ***
AFP -2.01 -11.05 *** -2.07 -11.35 ***
AFP^2 0.77 8.98 *** 0.80 9.29 ***
Constant -13.95 -20.03 *** -13.85 -19.53 *** -14.20 -19.89 *** -13.95 -19.78 ***
Rose Effect of EMU2 76% 19% 83% 22%
     5%-confidence interval 55-100% 3-38% 61-107% 5-42%
Rose Effect of EMU1 23% 22%
     5%-confidence interval 13-34% 13-33%
 Number of observations 34892 34892 34892 34892
 Adj R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
 Root MSE      2.67 2.66 2.67 2.66
Non-linearity of the trade volatility link (1991-2002) - pooled data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
 
 The results, shown in table 4-2, provide direct support for the non-linearity hypothesis and 
some support for the smooth-form of the convexity since the linear term is negative and the quadratic 
term is positive;  
The fact that EMU2 is significant even when the quadratic volatility term is included, suggest 
a couple of possibilities. First, the trade-volatility link may look like a combination of the smooth and 
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discrete forms illustrated in Figure 4-1; that is that trade falls according to the curved line right up to 
zero volatility but then it jumps up to point B. Second, it could be that there is no discrete jump at 
zero volatility but that the true relationship is more non-linear that can be captured by a second order 
approximation. To pursue this line of thinking, we include a cubic volatility term and higher order 
terms.  
Table 4-3:  Higher order volatility terms 
EMU2 (Both trade partners in EMU) 0.60 9.35 *** 0.23 2.78 ***
EMU1 (Only one  trade partner in EMU) 0.21 4.81 *** 0.22 5.05 ***
(Value Added)i*(Apparent Consumption)j 0.51 27.11 *** 0.48 25.58 *** 0.49 26.04 *** 0.48 25.25 ***
(Producer Prices)i*(Producer Prices)j 0.29 13.10 *** 0.32 14.41 *** 0.31 14.30 *** 0.33 14.84 ***
EU Membership 2.84 53.48 *** 2.76 51.42 *** 2.83 53.15 *** 2.81 52.76 ***
Volatility (5 years moving average) -69.94 -18.80 *** -63.57 -16.54 ***
Vol^2 (5 years moving average) 59705.15 13.65 *** 54399.25 12.09 ***
Vol^3 (5 years moving average) -1621043 -0.81 ns -1013877 -0.51 ns
Vol^4 (5 years moving average) (dropped)  (dropped)
AFP -1.31 -1.72 * -0.02 -0.02 ns
AFP^2 5.82 2.00 ** 9.76 3.14 ***
AFP^3 -11.40 2.92 *** -16.02 -3.92 ***
AFP^4 -5.44 -3.24 *** -7.25 -4.17 ***
Constant -13 -20.03 *** -13.41 -18.77 *** 13.25 -19.89 *** -13.43 -18.85 ***
Rose Effect of EMU2 82% 26%
     5%-confidence interval 61-107% 7-48%
Rose Effect of EMU1 23% 24%
     5%-confidence interval 13-34% 14-35%
 Number of observations 34892 34892 34892 34892
 Adj R-squared 0.7201 0.72 0.72 0.72
 Root MSE      2.6704 2.67 2.66 2.66
Non-linearity of the trade volatility link (1991-2002) - pooled data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
We report only the cubic and quadratic terms since STATA drops the 5th and above orders 
automatically. The results are mildly encouraging, as table 4-3 shows. Columns (1) and (2) report 
results for the specification where exchange rate uncertainty is proxied by the 5-years moving average 
volatility term (VOL) We estimate the same relationship without EMU dummy (column 1) and with a 
EMU dummy (column 2), respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report results for the same relationship – 
without and with EMU dummies – but where exchange rate uncertainty is proxied by the AFP term.  
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We first concentrate on the results from the AFP specification. When we exclude the EMU2 
and EMU1 terms, as suggested by the smooth form of convexity, all volatility terms are individually 
significant and of the expected sign. The second order term is positive and the third order term 
negative – we do not have priors concerning higher order terms. In the VOL specification, the cubic 
term has the right sign but it is statistically not significant. 
It is interesting and perhaps important that when we include linear, quadric and cubic 
volatility terms, the EMU2 and EMU1 dummies are still significant; see columns (2) and (4). This 
suggests that there may be a pure Monetary Union effect in the sense of a discrete jump in trade when 
volatility reaches zero.  
There is a theoretical possibility that the non-monotonicity of the relationship allows for the 
trade-volatility link to become positive once past a certain threshold. In order to control for this, we 
calculated  the nadir of the volatility coefficient by first differencing the equation under study. Results 
in table 4-4 indicate that the non-monotonic hypothesis concerns only a small percentage of data. It 
concerns less than 5 percent of the data when using a backward measure of uncertainty such as the 
moving average of the annual variance of the weekly nominal exchange rate return both when the 
specification includes only the EMU2 dummy (specification 1) and when it also include the EMU1 
dummy (specification 3). When the AFP measure of uncertainty is used, no data points are concerned 
by the problem (specifications 2 and 4). Furthermore the data which, in specification 1 and 3 are 
concerned by the non-monotonicity include only goods with high costs of research and development 
and a short life-cycle such as electronic and computer related goods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
Table 4-4 – Testing for non-monotonicity  
 
 
 
In conclusion, these the empirical evidence signals the co-existence of a convex relationship 
between volatility and trade and of a discrete jump in presence of a Monetary Union and the link 
seems to hold for the overwhelming majority of goods. 
4.2 Sectoral results 
We estimated the model using a fixed-effect panel estimator (time series data on each bilateral 
trade flow) for each sector separately. Table 4-2 shows the results for the variable that are of greatest 
TABLE RESULTS NON-MONOTONICITY
tot. k of first order differentiation -71.35 -12.06 -72.99 -12.01
vol turning point 0.00070 7.81652 0.00068 7.5087
no. of obs involved 216 4.1% 0 0% 222 4.2% 0 0%
tot observations 5292 5292 5292 5292
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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interest to us, namely the monetary union dummy and our uncertainty measure.15 In particular, it 
shows – for the same four specifications as in the pooled regression – the percentage impact of EMU2 
and EMU1 on trade, along with potential trade creation through the elimination of intra-euro area 
exchange rate uncertainty. We also report the sum of the EMU2 and the uncertainty effect. We only 
provide the figures of those results which are significant at least at 10%. 
We use all sectors, subsectors and their aggregations provided by the OECD STAN and BTD 
databases. Note that these report a somewhat overlapping classification of data with 2 and 3 digit 
sectors, depending on availability. For example, sector 27 is reported together with sector 28, and 
separately.  Therefore, we mark the bigger categories, which incompass several sub-sectors, in bold in 
the table. Moreover, with the value added specification, the number of observations varies 
substantially between sectors (see Annex), as sectoral value added data are not available for the 
complete sample. 
The results indicate that while exchange rate uncertainty appears to be consistently negative 
and significant across sectors, the average effect of EMU2 is now somewhat lower than in the 
estimations where we pooled across sectors as well, with an average between 21 and 108% when 
taking the average only over those sectors, where the EMU2 dummy is significant..  
Similar to the pooled regressions, results for the specifications with the volatility term (VOL) 
tend to report a higher EMU2 dummy coefficient than the ones with the absolute forecast premium 
(AFP). By construction, the EMU2 dummy reflects both the impact of the mere creation of EMU and 
residual effects linked to the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and not otherwise depicted. Our 
finding might pledge in favour of the AFP as a more appropriate proxy for exchange rate uncertainty 
than the VOL specification. 
It is insightful to look at the joint effect of the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty 
(measured using the AFP or VOL data) and the ‘Rose’ effect (i.e. the effect of the mere creation of a 
                                                   
15
 Tables with the full results for all variables can be found in the Annex. 
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currency union). The sum of the coefficients for the two effects indicates figures for trade creation 
ranging from 40% to 87%.16 Furthermore, the combined effect doesn’t show swings as large as the 
ones reported earlier for the individual EMU dummy effect. It shows, on the contrary, little 
sensitiveness to the chosen specification of exchange rate uncertainty and volatility – trade creation 
amounts to 61-87% when using the VOL specifications, and to 40-82% for the AFP specifications. 
Ordering the sectors according to the size of the coefficients for VOL and AFP shows that – although 
similar when using the same uncertainty measure – the ranking differs between VOL and AFP 
specifications. It also differ depending on what size variable is chosen.  
The impact of EMU seems to differ substantially across sectors, with relatively strong effects for the 
following sectors “Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing”,  “Electricity, gas and water 
supply”, “Food products, beverages and tobacco”, “Rubber and plastics products”, “Textiles, textile 
products, leather and footwear “, “Office, accounting and computing machinery”, “Motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers”, “Non-pharmaceutical chemicals”, and “Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel 
products”. It should be noted that the first sector was subject to a huge number of privatisations over 
the last years in the EU, so that the EMU dummy could catch up some of this effect as well. At the 
same time, we find no significant EMU effect for protected manufactures and commodities, as 
“Aircraft and spacecraft”, “Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel”, “Iron and steel”, 
“Mining and quarrying”, “Railroad equipment transport equipment” and “Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing”.  
Interestingly, these results are in line with findings in Chapter 1, which using a different data-
set based on a different industry classification (NACE) and a different set of countries and years, 
                                                   
16
 It should be noted that this average includes all sectors, rather than only those where the EMU2 dummy is significant, as 
above. Therefore, it is not fully comparable with the average over the EMU2 dummy effect. 
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reported highest volatility coefficients for food, chemical products, textiles, footwear and consumer 
appliances.  
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Our findings suggest that the theoretical model proposed in section 3 explains better those 
sectors characterised by imperfect competition features and increasing returns to scale. It should be 
noted that, similarly to the pooled regression, the size variable seems to have an impact on the size 
and significance of the EMU dummies. In particular, the effect appears stronger when using the value 
added rather than the GDP specification, and it is mostly not significant for the specification with 
GDP and volatility. As expected, the ordering of the sectors according to the size of the EMU effect is 
similar between the two GDP specification on the one hand, and between the two value added 
specifications on the other hand, while differences emerge between the GDP and the value added 
specification. 
Finally, the third country dummy points to trade creation of 10-17% between non-euro area 
and euro area countries, but is mostly not significant when using the GDP specification. The ordering 
of the sectors according to the size of the third country effect is similar in both value-added 
specifications. 
As for the pooled regression, we also calculated a 5%-confidence interval in order to check 
the results obtained above (see Table 4-5). 
  
Table 4-6: Sectoral results with 5%-confidence intervals 
  Specification with VOL Specification with AFP 
  Specif. with VA Specif. with GDP Specif. with VA Specif. with GDP 
  EMU2 EMU1 EMU2 EMU1 EMU2 EMU1 EMU2 EMU1 
01-05 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing   -2-111      
10-14 Mining and quarrying      10-10   
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 9-131  20-134  -4-104 11-11 -4-89  
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear 
 -43--4 5-112   -39-3   
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 39-230 15-103 1-109  9-157 30-126   
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and 
publishing 
17-148  15-128  3-117    
23-25 Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel 
products 
25-156 -3-55 3-110  6-115 0-59   
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
   0-124  24-26  -4-114 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 32-183 22-101 -1-100  11-138 25-105   
2423 Pharmaceuticals 17-193 45-193  -2-72 -3-145 46-193  -2-71 
24ex2423 Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 11-173 0-84 4-107   6-94   
25 Rubber and plastics products  -42--7 13-122   -41--6   
26 Other non-metallic mineral products  -36-2 -5-88      
27-28 Basic metals and fabricated metal 
products 
  -3-96      
27 Basic metals 32-211    -1-135    
271+2731 Iron and steel         
272+2732 Non-ferrous metals 46-303    -3-168    
28 Fabricated metal products   2-98      
29-33 Machinery and equipment 11-143 2-70 1-108  -5-108 6-76   
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 50-226 15-90 -4-91  24-170 19-97   
30-33 Electrical and optical equipment 1-109  3-108      
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 86-306 6-89 6-119  43-214 13-99   
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec  -40-1   -51-3    
32 Radio, television and communication  36-196 13-109   8-136 14-109   
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments -5-128 -5-83 -5-83   0-92   
34-35 Transport equipment 107-357 21-111 2-113  72-281 33-129   
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 57-296 21-117 5-121  35-242 29-130   
35 Other transport equipment 50-312 6-105 -6-106  33-265 24-140   
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 21-631  40-384  12-585  6-272  
352+359 Railroad equipment and transport equipment 
n.e.c. 
        
353 Aircraft and spacecraft         
36-37 Manufacturing nec; recycling 18-156 5-70 7-110  8-133 14-85   
40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply  -93--66 217-1744 -77--19  -93--64 165-1498 -81--33 
Note: The 5% interval is calculated in the following way: the standard error of the coefficient is multiplied with the critical 
value at 2.5% (1.96) and subtracted from (for the lower bound of the confidence interval), and added to (for the upper bound 
of the confidence interval) the coefficient estimate. 
 
The results show that the 5%-confidence interval is very large for most sectors, varying for 
example for the sector ‘Machinery and equipment’ between 11 and 143%. The size of the interval 
differs across sectors, but the results confirm those of the pooled regression, in that point estimates for 
the EMU effect need to be taken with caution. 
  
5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter contributes to the rapidly growing literature on the impact of Europe’s monetary 
union on trade, by proposing, for the first time, an analysis of sectoral data. 
We empirically test a gravity-like model of trade, using a range of different specifications. 
This allows us to experiment on result sensitivity to the chosen specification for exchange rate 
uncertainty, for the size variable of the gravity equation and for different sectors. A first set of 
estimations pools data across countries and sectors, while in a second instance data are pooled only 
across countries, allowing thereby for sectoral differences. 
We introduce both an exchange rate uncertainty term (proxied by two alternative measures: the 
variance of the nominal exchange rate return, VOL, and the absolute forecast premium, AFP) and an 
EMU dummy into our model. The results for both specifications lead us to conclude that the effect of 
exchange rate uncertainty is negative, significant and robust to changes in its specification. 
Furthermore, we also find that exchange rate uncertainty and the EMU dummy are jointly significant. 
This lead us to suspect the existence of non-linearities in the relationship between trade and exchange 
rate volatility and uncertainty.  To pursue this line of thinking, we include a cubic volatility term and 
higher order terms. The results are encouraging and signal the co-existence of a convex relationship 
between volatility and trade and of a discrete jump in presence of a Monetary Union. 
According to our estimates, the mere creation of EMU would increase trade by 70-112% 
according to the regression pooled both by country and industry, and by 21-108% according to the 
sector-by-sector panels (taking into account only significant estimates). The EMU effect is smaller 
when using AFP as proxy for exchange rate uncertainty. We believe that this might be indicative of 
the fact that the AFP well approximates the exchange rate uncertainty. In this context, the bigger 
figures for the EMU dummy can be read as reflecting some of the uncertainty impact that the VOL 
proxy is unable to depict. Adding the effect of the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty to the so-
  
called ‘Rose’ effect of the mere creation of a currency union, the results indicate a trade creation 
between 91 and 119% according to the pooled regression, and to 40 to 87% according to the sectoral 
regression (taking this time account of all sectors, i.e. not excluding those for which the EMU dummy 
was not significant). 
It should be noted that the size of the EMU effect is also sensitive on the choice of size 
variable (GDP or value added by sector). The many measurement problems and the limited 
availability of sectoral value added data are one possible source of the observed discrepancies. 
Account of the differences in results might derive from the fact that when dealing with sectoral data, 
the mapping between empirical and theoretical measures for the size variables of the gravity equation 
(endowment of factors and expenditures) is problematic. Both aggregate GDP and sectoral value 
added are imperfect approximations of the real import demand and export supply values, which take 
into account cross sector elasticities. Hence, given the difficulties of precisely assessing the extent of 
trade creation brought about by the EMU, we suggest considering the figures provided by our 
estimations as upper and lower bounds of the possible range of effects.  
We also test whether EMU has a significant impact on trade flows with non-EMU countries. 
In line with other authors, we find a significant and positive impact in most specifications, indicating 
that third countries tend to trade up to 27% more with EMU countries since the creation of EMU. 
This effect is stronger for those sectors characterised by increasing returns to scale and imperfect 
competition features. 
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Annex 2.1 : Data 
Imports: OECD Bilateral Sectoral Trade Database. The sectors (ISIC Rev. 3) are: 
ISIC rev 3 sectors in the dataset (In bold sectors used in pooled estimation) 
Industry
01-05 AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING
10-14 MINING AND QUARRYING
15-16 FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO
15-37 TOTAL MANUFACTURING
17-19 TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR
20 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK
21-22 PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
23 ….COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL
23-25 CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL PRODUCTS
24 ….CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS
2423 ……PHARMACEUTICALS
24ex2423 ……CHEMICALS EXCLUDING PHARMACEUTICALS
25 ….RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS
26 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS
27 ….BASIC METALS
27-28 BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
271+2731 ……IRON AND STEEL
272+2732 ……NON-FERROUS METALS
28 ….FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
29 ….MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C.
29-33 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
30 ……OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY
30-33 ….ELECT RICAL AND OPT ICAL EQUIPMENT
31 ……ELECT RICAL MACHINERY AND APPARAT US , NEC
32 ……RADIO, T ELEVIS ION AND COMMUNICAT ION EQUIPMENT
33 ……MEDICAL, PRECIS ION AND OPT ICAL INS T RUMENT S
34 ….MOT OR VEHICLES , T RAILERS  AND S EMI-T RAILERS
34-35 T RANS PORT  EQUIPMENT
35 ….OT HER T RANS PORT  EQUIPMENT
351 ……BUILDING AND REPAIR ING OF  S HIPS  AND BOAT S
352+359 ……RAILROAD EQUIPMENT  AND T RANS PORT  EQUIPMENT  N.E .C.
353 ……AIRCRAFT  AND S PACECRAFT
36-37 MANUFACT URING NEC; RECYCLING
40-41 ELECT RICIT Y, GAS  AND WAT ER S UPPLY
GRAND T OT AL
 
Notes: 
1. Imports are deflated using overall manufacturing producer prices. 
2. Exchange rates: Bank of Internationl Settlements (BIS). 
3. GDP: Real GDP, OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
4. Value added per sector and gross production: OECD Structural Statistics for Industry and Services (See 
www.oecd.org/std/industry-services for more information, deflated with manufacturing producer 
prices. 
5. PPI: from OECD Main Economic Indicators, originally in national currency, converted into USD using 
OECD exchange rates. Note that for the euro area countries, the original data were back-converted into 
an artificial euro, so that we converted them into USD using the euro for the whole period (also pre-
EMU). (see newsletter OECD, Nb 4 page 6). 
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Chapter 3 – Does Monetary Union Make Running a 
Monetary Union Easier? Implications of a Natural 
Experiment from Europe* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Formation of a monetary union may lead to a change in trade price behaviour by altering the costs and 
benefits for companies of charging different prices in different countries. As a result, one should expect 
greater harmonisation of prices across monetary union members via the imported/exported inflation 
channel. If monetary union also greatly increases the amount of trade among members as claimed by 
Rose (2000), this harmonisation of prices effect will become even more pronounced. The problem is that 
standard estimates of price transmission speed suggest that trade’s price-homogenising effect operates 
too slowly to matter much. Some new empirical evidence, however, suggests that a reduction in 
exchange rate variability reduces the variability of international price differences. Moreover, the effect 
seems to be highly nonlinear, and monetary union seems to have an effect even controlling for exchange 
rate volatility. This chapter is a first attempt to test part of this mechanism, namely the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on the international transmission of price shocks via the imported/exported 
inflation channel. We generate specific testable hypotheses and confront these with a number of data 
sets on European trade prices. The empirical results broadly support the predictions that, ceteris 
paribus, trade partners with lower bilateral exchange rate volatility should experience more rapid 
movements back towards the law of one price. The obvious implication is that monetary union could 
produce changes in corporate strategies that result in faster cross-border transmission of price 
movements via the import and export price channel which, in turn, would tend to homogenise price 
movements across the member countries of a monetary union. 
 
 
JEL Classification: D40, F15, F31. 
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linearities, no-arbitrage bands, harmonisation of price movements. 
                                                   
*
 I wish to thank seminar participants at the 2003 NBER Summer Institute in Trade and Investment, the ECB’s Working 
Group on Econometric Modelling and participants at the European Trade Study Group Annual Conference, Kiel, Germany, 
as well as at the Royal Economic Society Conference, University of Warwick, April 2003 for their very useful comments 
which have been incorporated into the paper. 

  
1 Introduction 
Two seemingly unconnected empirical results suggest an intriguing mechanism. 
First, economic integration helps harmonize prices internationally, with trade being the 
primary channel (Rogoff 1996, Goldberg and Knetter 1997). Second, monetary union may 
greatly increase the amount of trade among members (Rose 2001). Putting these together, 
we see that formation of a monetary union may induce changes that help harmonise inflation 
rates. The effect might be large if the elimination of exchange rate volatility simultaneously 
leads to a large increase in intra-union trade and a big increase in the speed at which price 
shocks are transmitted across members’ goods markets.  
The problem is that standard estimates of price transmission speed (Rogoff 1996, 
Goldberg and Knetter 1997) suggest that trade’s price-homogenising effect operates too 
slowly to matter much – so slowly that many find the domestic-foreign price gap to be a 
random walk. Some new empirical evidence (Parsley and Wei 2001, and Asplund and 
Friberg 2001) suggests that a reduction in exchange rate variability reduces the variability of 
international price differences. Moreover, the effect seems to be highly nonlinear, and 
monetary union seems to have an effect even controlling for exchange rate volatility.  
This chapter, after justifying, from a theoretical point of view, part of this 
mechanism –  namely the impact of monetary union (and exchange rate volatility more 
generally) on the international transmission of price shocks via the imported/exported 
inflation channel –, provides some evidence of the relevance of this assumption for 
empirical studies. In doing this we generate specific testable hypotheses and confront these 
with a number of data sets on European trade prices.  
The chapter begins by presenting the mechanism linking exchange rate volatility and trade 
price pass-through (Section 2). As part of this, Section 2 summarizes theories that study 
  
pricing behaviour under the assumption of endogenous market segmentation and the 
implications of this for pass-through. Section 3 takes the theory’s main predictions to the 
data and empirically tests the hypotheses. The final section presents our concluding remarks.  
At the outset we should note that the link between the theoretical framework and the 
empirical testing is intentionally loose. The theory generates some stylised predictions about 
firms pricing behaviour as a response to different degrees of exchange rate volatility, but it 
is by no means a complete description of price determination. The empirical section does 
not seek to test directly the model but rather looks for evidence of non-linearities in 
European import prices and at exchange volatility as a possible source of these non-
linearities.  
2 Theoretical underpinnings 
Firms engaged in international trade frequently set different prices for their goods in 
different markets. Third degree price discrimination is the name given in the IO-literature to 
this practice. It is also known in international trade theory as market segmentation.   
Actual and potential arbitrage, however, tends to limit the extent of resulting price 
gaps. If prices diverge sufficiently – and the goods sold in the different markets are 
sufficiently good substitutes – third parties will be tempted to arbitrage price gaps by re-
exporting, re-importing goods, or by simply re-directing exports before they reach their 
intended destination. What all this goes to say is that unless firms explicitly engage in 
strategies to make price arbitrage expensive or illegal, their ability to price discriminate will 
naturally be limited.  
The theoretical framework summarized in this chapter describes the optimal degree 
of market segmentation from the perspective of trading firms, by looking at the cost and 
  
benefits of ‘buying’ a given degree of market segmentation (defined as the maximum price 
gap that cannot be arbitraged). As it turns out, exchange rate volatility has an important 
impact on the degree of optimal market segmentation (Friberg 2001). The logic involves 
three steps.  
First, discriminatory pricing is always profitable when demand elasticities vary 
across markets, but exchange rate variation is surely a far more important real-world motive 
for wanting to price discriminate. When the exchange rate gets a long way from its steady 
state value, firms will have a very large profit-incentive to ‘price to market’, i.e. to charge 
very different prices in different markets. Since this is true for both appreciations and 
depreciations, the value of being able to price discriminate is a U-shaped function of the 
level of the exchange rate, with the nadir of the U at the long-run exchange rate.  
The second step is to note that the expected value of this U-shaped function changes 
with the volatility of the exchange rate. In essence, a more volatile exchange rate means that 
one more frequently observes exchange rates where it would be very profitable to price 
discriminate.  
The final step is to consider the cost of market segmentation. Assuming that a higher 
degree of market segmentation involves corporate strategies that are progressively more 
expensive, profit maximising firms will choose a degree of segmentation (i.e. a maximum 
price gap) where the marginal benefit of further segmentation just equals its marginal cost. 
Because reduced exchange rate volatility lowers the marginal benefit of segmentation, firms 
will find it optimal to lower the degree of market segmentation in response to dampened 
exchange rate variability.  
  
2.1 Models of Endogenous Market Segmentation 
 
There are two papers Friberg (2001) and Anderton, Baldwin and Taglioni (2003), 
who make the degree of market segmentation endogenous. Here we refer to the latter – ABT 
henceforth – which combines elements from Friberg (2001) with elements drawn from the 
old sunk-cost hysteresis literature (Baldwin 1988, Baldwin and Krugman 1989, Dixit 1989), 
and especially its application to European monetary union (Baldwin 1991). 
In ABT, a change in exchange rate volatility – formation of a monetary union, for 
example – induces trading firms to change their behaviour in a way that tends to harmonize 
aggregate price movements between nations.  
2.1.1 Basic set-up 
 
To illustrate the main economic logic of this analytic framework, we assume a 
partial equilibrium model with linear demand functions. In this model there are only two 
nations (Home and Foreign, which are a priori identical) and we consider a market where a 
monopolist (located in the ‘home’ country) sells in both markets. Demand in the two 
markets is given by: 
Equation 2-1 
**; paqpaq 
 
where p and q represent the price and quantity sold respectively and “a” represents a simple 
intercept. 
Variables without an”*” are home-nation variables, while those with an ”*” are 
foreign nation variables. Without loss of generality, units are chosen so that the slopes of the 
identical demand curves are unity.  
The firm’s production technology involves constant marginal costs such that: 
  
Equation 2-2 
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where c is the constant marginal cost, which depends on w, the home nation wage, and aq, 
the unit input labour requirement, both of which are taken as constant. 
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that there are no forms of trade costs (natural and 
manmade), so the firm’s two-market objective function is: 
Equation 2-3 
*)(max
**
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where ’s’ is the exchange rate – s is a mnemonic for spot rate –  defined as foreign currency 
units per unit of home currency. Note that a fall in ’s’ raises the competitiveness of home-
nation goods in the foreign market, i.e. is a depreciation of the home currency. 
 
2.1.2 Market segmentation assumptions 
 
Traditionally, effects of the implementation of the Single Market in Europe have 
only been analysed by comparing prices, profits and welfare under the two polar cases of 
perfect segmentation versus perfect integration.  While this classification of markets into 
one of the two polar segmentation cases is convenient, it is not terribly accurate. 
Furthermore, whether markets are perfectly integrated or perfectly segmented has 
traditionally just been assumed in the literature.   
More realistically, one expects that firms can engage in a whole array of strategies 
that make cross-market resale increasingly difficult via some sort of product differentiation 
  
or by lobbying for favourable forms of government regulations17. For example, a German 
food company that wishes to price discriminate between the German and French markets, 
but not between the German and Dutch markets, could produce one version of the good with 
a German-and-Dutch-language label and another with a French-language-only label. This 
labelling would make it expensive to arbitrage price differences, but not impossible unless 
this differentiation were combined with  government regulations on the sale of food labelled 
in the ‘wrong’ language and a ban on third party re-labelling. Implementing this strategy 
may involve a fixed cost in adjusting the production line; an investment that may be 
worthwhile, if the exchange rate is very volatile. 
In the following paragraphs we will first outline the two polar case of segmentation 
and then develop the intermediate – and more realistic – case of imperfectly and variably 
segmented markets. 
  
2.1.2.1 Perfectly segmented markets vs. perfectly integrated markets 
To fix ideas, we first clarify the firm’s problem assuming the two polar cases of  
perfectly segmented and perfectly integrated markets.  
When markets are perfectly segmented, a firm is free to choose a price in each market. The 
other extreme assumption is perfectly integrated markets, i.e. where firms are constrained to 
choose a single price for sales to the two markets.  
Friberg’s insight establishes that the reward of being able to segment markets 
relative to setting equal prices (integrated market pricing) depends on the exchange rate’s 
probability distribution.  The more the exchange rate deviates from its long run value, the 
                                                   
17
 The key aspect of segmentation is the inability of consumers to re-sell goods across markets since this prevents 
arbitrageurs from exploiting and eroding price differences. The European Union (EU) does not allow firms to forbid re-sale 
within the EU, so segmentation requires some sort of product differentiation, perhaps combined with government 
regulation. 
  
more profitable is to be able to segment markets. Hence the formulation of Insight 1: the 
expected values of having perfectly segmented markets increases as exchange rate volatility 
increases.  
This general result can be illustrated by means of Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2. It can 
be demonstrated that the firm optimisation problem under the two polar assumptions 
reduces to Equation 2-4.  
Equation 2-4 
c
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s
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While Equation 2-4 is not everywhere convex – because of the asymmetric effects 
of appreciation and depreciation18 – it is convex in the neighbourhood of the long-run 
exchange rate s=1.  
The left panel of Figure 2-1 plots the two profit functions against s; the higher curve 
is PSM and the lower curve is PIM. Clearly the wedge between the two, and thus the value 
of being able to price discriminate, increases as ‘s’ deviates from its long-run value (which 
is here normalised to unity). The right panel plots the PSM-PIM directly against s; this 
clearly shows the intrinsic asymmetry involved in the PSM-vs-PIM wedge.  
                                                   
18
 The profit function in the case of perfectly segmented markets is inherently asymmetric with respect to the exchange rate 
s. As the spot rate rises, the home-based firm looses competitiveness in the foreign market and eventually stops exporting. 
With linear demand this happens at a finite s, but with general demand, exports limit to zero as s. But as the spot rate 
declines, the profitability of exports sales increases without bound in terms of home country currency. This has nothing to 
do with functional forms because it is driven by the translation of foreign currency earnings into local currency units. 
  
Figure 2-1: Difference between profits under PSM and PIM 
 
 
For the parameter values use to draw the figure (a=10, c=1), the choke off points are 1/19 and 10. 
 
 
Source:  ABT (2003) 
A complete characterisation of the link between volatility and expected value of the 
PSM-vs-PIM wedge is shown in  Figure 2-2  (here a=10 and c=1). Notice that the 
relationship is highly nonlinear; the impact of volatility reduction on the value of having 
perfect segmentation gets weaker as the level of volatility falls.  
Figure 2-2: Volatility and the expected value of the PSM-vs-PIM wedge 
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   Sourc. ABT (2003) 
 
  
2.1.2.2 Variably segmented markets 
In reality markets are never perfectly integrated or perfectly segmented because 
firms can engage in activities that make arbitrage more costly. The degree of segmentation 
is variable in the sense that the firm can choose the price gap level – i.e., the difference 
between prices charged by a firm on the home market and those charged by the same firm 
abroad –  at which can safely segment markets without having to fear arbitrage. The firm 
does so by investing in making it increasingly difficult for consumers to resell goods, hence 
ensuring a certain degree of market segmentation. ABT show that the cost of doing so is 
quadratic and strictly convex in the price gap, implying a positive marginal cost of 
increasing the gap.  
Volatility enters into the picture because it affects the level of segmentation chosen 
by the firm. The lower the volatility, the lower the level of optimal segmentation, i.e. the 
lower the expected value of segmenting markets (from insight 1). Hence this translates into 
a weaker incentive to segment (which is costly).  Because of this mechanism, a lower price 
gap implies a narrower exchange rate band (i.e. a range of price gaps where arbitrage is non 
binding). This reasoning leads us to a second important insight: the degree of market 
segmentation – measured by the width of the non-binding arbitrage band and denoted G – is 
lower, the lower the volatility of exchange rates.   
  
Figure 2-3: VSM vs. PIM profit functions, and marginal benefit and cost of G 
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We can illustrate the impact of variably segmented markets (VSM) with the left 
panel of Figure 2-3. For a given G, i.e. a given width of the non-binding arbitrage band, the 
high and low bounds on s will be fixed and for realisations of the exchange rate within this 
range, the difference between VSM and PIM is identical to the difference between PSM and 
PIM as in the right panel of Figure 2-1. When s is higher than shi, the firm is able to do 
somewhat better under VSM than it would with perfectly integrated markets, but not as well 
as if it had perfectly segmented markets. This is shown with the bottom dashed line on the 
right side of the diagram. Similarly, when s is below slo, the firm does better than PIM but 
worse that PSM, as shown by the lower right-side dashed line.   
If the firm ’buys’ a higher level of segmentation, as measured by G’, then its profits 
will unambiguously be higher or equal to those with G. The diagram shows this with the 
upper dashed lines on the right and left sides of the diagram. Notice that the benefit of 
higher G shows up only for exchange rates that are sufficiently far from the long-run level. 
  
To illustrate the optimal choice of G, and thus the optimal hysteresis bandwidth, we 
observe the plot the marginal benefit of G (the band of no-arbitrage) and the marginal costs 
in the right panel of. MC is rising. The MB curve is more involved. For a given level of 
exchange rate volatility, an increase in G widens the hysteresis band. Figure 2-3 helps us to 
evaluate the impact of this. As the band widens, some realisations of s will correspond to a 
high profit level (the solid PSM vs PIM line instead of the dashed line). However, each 
successive increase in G affects a progressively narrower range of s. As a consequence, the 
marginal benefit of raising G falls with the level of G, as shown in the right panel of  Figure 
2-3 .  
The optimal G corresponds to the intersection of the MC and MB curves. For 
sufficiently high exchange rate volatility, for example ’, the firm will choose a positive G’. 
As the figure shows, lowering  to, say ”,will result in a progressively lower optimal G, 
viz. G”. Importantly, this model predicts segmentation only reaches zero when the level of  
is zero. The analysis can be summarised as follows: 
To re-cap, the model assumes that the price-gap can move within a certain range without 
any threat of arbitrage, and that this “no-arbitrage price band” is wider for bilateral trading 
relationships where firms anticipate a higher level of exchange rate volatility. But outside of 
this band of “price inaction” arbitrage pressures push prices back towards the law of one 
price. Accordingly, the idea that the scope for arbitrage is reduced where exchange rates are 
more volatile implies that temporary deviations from the law of one price are likely to be 
less rapidly corrected as the degree of exchange rate volatility rises. Hence, countries with 
lower exchange rate volatility – and by extension members of a monetary union – should 
experience more rapid movements back towards the law of one price due to the reduction – 
or complete elimination – of exchange rate volatility.  
  
The testable implication of this result is clear. The estimated bandwidth should be 
narrower when using data for nations that have experienced relatively little bilateral 
exchange rate variation.  
3 A Natural Experiment: The DM Bloc  
The theoretical model summarised in section 2 suggests that pass-through should be 
linked to bilateral exchange rate volatility, but bringing this prediction to the data is 
problematic. The logic of our model suggests that pass-through is the result of conscious 
investments by firms. Since some of these investments are presumably long lasting – for 
example, the decision to produce differentiated products for export markets, or lobbying for 
regulatory segmentation – it is somewhat difficult to know how to measure volatility. Firms 
make the investment today in expectation of tomorrow’s volatility, so what we need is a 
measure of how volatile firms expected the exchange rate to be in the next few years. While 
there are a variety of ways of dealing with this econometrically, we choose instead to rely on 
a natural experiment.  
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in the 1970s, 
Europe adopted a string of managed exchange rate systems. European bilateral exchange 
rates nevertheless fluctuated widely with one important exception. Right from the beginning 
of post-Bretton Woods period, a group of countries – the deutschemark (DM) bloc – 
maintained quite tight bilateral rates. For example, the DM-guilder bilateral rate was not 
realigned between 1983 and the start of the monetary union and the bilateral exchange rate 
fluctuated within a very narrow band during this period, even narrower than the maximum 
allowed under the European Monetary System’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
Similarly, the Danish crown, Belgium franc, and Austrian schilling have had very stable 
relationships with the DM since the late 1980s.  
  
Figure 3-1: Bilateral exchange rate volatility, DM bloc and others, 1960-1994 
 
Importantly, this arrangement was stable and widely expected to continue. As 
Error! Reference source not found. shows, the DM bloc exchange rates stayed close 
throughout the long sequence of exchange rate crises in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Firms 
engaged in intra-DM bloc trading should, therefore, have had sufficient time and incentives 
to adjust their segmenting strategies to the lower degree of exchange rate volatility. What 
this means is that historical data should reveal  a difference in trade-pricing behaviour 
between Germany and the DM bloc nations and between Germany and other nations.  
3.1  Null hypothesis: naïve linear model 
The theoretical model presented in section 2 generates a number of testable 
predictions, but the most obvious are the following:    
 Pass-through behaviour should depend upon bilateral exchange rate 
volatility, and 
 There exists a band or threshold which creates nonlinear adjustment to long-
run equilibrium (resulting from a greater tendency for arbitrage outside the 
band compared to inside the band). Thus as a first cut, we investigate 
whether we can reject the null hypothesis that pass-through behaviour is 
unrelated to exchange rate volatility. 
3.1.1 The naïve empirical model  
To test the null hypothesis we need an empirical model and here we adopt the 
“linear model” that has been used countless times in the purchasing power parity (PPP) and 
law of one price (LOOP) literature (see Rogoff 1996 for an overview). This model focuses 
on the gap between prices charged in different locations measured in the same currency (i.e., 
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in this case, the gap between a country’s export price and its domestic price). Taking ‘z’ as 
the price gap, the model is usually written as: 
Equation 3-1 
ttt ezz   1  
 
where et is an iid error term. Thus, we assume that zt follows an AR(1) process. For 
convenience, the model is not specified in terms of the underlying AR(1) parameter  but 
rather the speed-of-convergence parameter, -1. That is,  obeys –1    0 and it is the 
convergence speed in the sense that price differentials are reduced each period by a fraction 
 plus an error term. A  equal to zero implies perfect persistence (random walk); a  equal 
to minus one indicates zero persistence (iid behaviour). 
3.1.1.1  The data  
Mindful of the problem of the low power of afflicting many empirical analyses of 
the LOOP, we conduct our analysis on a panel setting.  We test this simple AR(1) 
specification using a panel of German import price data from 17 industrialised trade partners 
covering 8 manufacturing (2-digit) sectors in the period 1975-1995 (see data annex for 
details). Specifically, we denote pt1 and pt2  as the log price levels of a good in two locations 
at time t. In our dataset, pt1 is the German import price of goods imported from country 2, 
and pt2 is the producer price in country 2 (the exporting country) both measured in the 
exporter’s currency, and the difference between these two prices is the price gap. Volatility 
is measured as the annual variance of the weekly nominal exchange rate return: 
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where Sij is the nominal exchange rate between currencies i and j, and the subscript 
w is the week. This measure is calculated for each country pairing for which the bilateral 
trade flows are analysed. We do not use a volatility measure based on real exchange rates, as 
the data would be less homogeneous across countries. The results, however, should not 
differ much, as inflation rates were rather similar across the countries of our sample over our 
estimation period. 
A non-parametric test based on Cuzick (1985) fully rejects the presence of a trend in 
the data. Since the data are in index form, even in a world of perfect arbitrage, eventual 
mismatches could produce a constant gap. In order to overcome this potential problem, we 
demean the data. Specifically, we generate the price gap, zt, as the OLS residual from the 
regression of ln(pt1-pt2) on a constant  (however, qualitatively identical results are obtained 
using non-demeaned data series19). 
3.1.1.2 Testing for unit roots 
Equation 3-1 is roughly equivalent to the usual specifications used for testing for a 
unit root, and standard unit root tests would be the best way of testing whether  is 
equivalent or different to zero. Therefore, the obvious first step would be to also use 
Equation 3-1 to establish whether the price gap data are stationary. However, a problem 
arises because our main hypothesis is that the price gap moves in a nonlinear fashion due to 
threshold effects. Several papers demonstrate that standard unit root tests can give 
misleading results in the presence of nonlinear or threshold effects, hence unit root tests 
based on Equation 3-1 would be unreliable given the threshold effects predicted by our 
theoretical model.20 Although there are several papers that show how to test for a unit root in 
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 See Table 3.3. 
20
 For example, Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2001) demonstrate the very low power of standard univariate unit-root tests to 
reject a false null hypothesis of unit root behaviour when the true model is non-linearly mean reverting.   
  
the presence of nonlinearities or threshold effects,21  they are all derived for use in time 
series analysis and can not be easily translated for use in panel estimation. In our panel 
estimation framework, testing for unit roots with threshold effects in a similar fashion to the 
time series literature requires the computation of new critical values for panel data, which is 
clearly beyond the scope of this chapter.  Accordingly, we do not test whether the price gap 
panel-data are stationary as the results could be quite misleading. 
3.1.1.3 Results 
Following the logic of the DM-bloc natural experiment, we distinguished between 
import suppliers belonging to the so called DM-bloc, and other EU countries traditionally 
displaying highly volatile bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis Germany. We grouped data 
together for imports from Austria, Belgium (and Luxemburg), Denmark, and the 
Netherlands in one sub-sample (the DM bloc), and data on imports from France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom in another.  
As Table 3-1 shows, the difference in coefficients for the two groups using the naïve 
linear model is clear.22 The price gaps for intra-DM bloc trade are less persistent (i.e.,   
nearer to minus one) than the gaps for German imports from other EU nations. Specifically, 
it takes about a 18 months for half of a price shock to be reabsorbed (half life of 1.52 
periods) for intra-DM bloc trade, while it takes more than 20 months for the rest of the EU.23 
We also carried out a more formal test as to whether  is different for the DM-bloc by re-
estimating the parameter for the “All” category in Table 1 and adding a dummy variable for 
the DM-bloc countries (that is, we added another variable DDM*Zt-1 to the “All” category 
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 See, for example, Caner and Hansen (2001), Enders and Granger (1998), Shin and Lee (2001), etc.   
22
 As mentioned earlier, we do not test the data for unit roots because we do not have the correct panel-estimation critical 
values. Nevertheless, the large magnitude of the t-statistics for  shown in Table 1, suggest that the critical values would 
have to be extremely high if we were to reject the hypothesis of stationarity. 
23
 More formally, a log likelihood ratio test shows that the difference between the parameters is statistically significant at 
the 5% level of significance. 
  
regression, where DDM is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for the DM-bloc countries 
and zero otherwise). The dummy variable was both negatively signed and statistically 
significant, thereby supporting our results in Table 1 that the price gap for intra DM-bloc 
trade is less persistent than the price gaps for German imports from other nations.24    
Of course the fact that the DM-bloc produces different parameter estimates does not 
allow us to conclude that the difference is due to exchange rate volatility since, for example, 
the intra-DM bloc might involve a substantially different set of traded goods. We can say, 
however, that the fact that adjustment is quicker in the less volatile exchange rate  
environment is certainly consistent with our basic notion that firms choose to invest less in 
market segmentation where the bilateral exchange rate is less volatile.25  
Table 3-1: Testing the naïve linear model 
Linear AR1 specification  
 
Lambda AR1  half-life 
All -0.328 1.74 
 (0.006)*** 
 
DM Block -0.367 1.52 
 (0.007)*** 
 
Other EU -0.337 1.69 
 (0.017)*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Panel estimates on annual data for period 1975-1995 for a total dataset covering 
potentially 17 trade partners and 52 4-digit manufacturing sectors. However, in this case, 
All”  represents the DM bloc countries plus the other EU countries. Half-life=log (0.5)/log(1- 
 ). 
 
Additional supporting evidence can be found by splitting the whole sample of import 
price data into two sets of observations, one displaying low exchange rate volatility and the 
second high-volatility. In this exercise, we also include data on imports from Canada, 
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 The results were as follows:  = - 0.015 – 0.324 t-1 – 0.043 DDM*t-1 (with t-statistics of 54.6 and 2.2 for t-1 and 
DDM*t-1 respectively). An F-test of the restriction that the parameter for DDM*t-1 is equal to zero was strongly rejected 
by the data [F-test=18.29)].  
25
 Although this paper focuses on the impact of exchange rate volatility on the persistence of deviations away from the law 
of one price, there are many other reasons for the empirical failure of the law of one price, for example: transportation 
costs, trade barriers, imperfect information about prices in different locations, differences in national preferences (for a 
comprehensive survey, see Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). Accordingly, we choose our comparison group as ‘other EU’ as 
  
Finland, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and United States as well as the DM bloc and other EU 
nations. The resulting split is not country-specific since some suppliers may be classed as 
low-volatility in some years and high-volatility in other years. Running the simple naïve 
linear model on these two separate samples also produces significantly different 
coefficients, with price gaps in the more volatile dataset displaying greater persistence (see 
results on right hand side of Table 3-3 in section 3.3.2).26 Again, this is in line with our 
theoretical priors. 
3.2 Testing for pass-through hysteresis bands 
Confirmation that pass-through was quicker for trade flows marked by lower volatility 
provides a very rough check on our model, but the model makes much more precise 
predictions. We turn now to testing those predictions.  
The bedrock of our theoretical model is the existence of a band where price gaps are much 
harder to arbitrage. The simple model we worked with went further by assuming that 
arbitrage is perfect and instantaneous outside the band but impossible inside the band. 
Roughly speaking this would correspond to a price gap that followed a random walk with 
reflecting barriers. Plainly, instantaneous price changes are not the norm due to all sorts of 
adjustment costs. This leads us to introduce a new element, namely slow adjustment of the 
price gap outside of the band. In particular, our hypothesis is that when price gaps are small 
                                                                                                                                                                     
these countries should have similar transport costs and trade barriers as the DM bloc – hence differences in    are more 
likely to be due to differences in exchange rate volatility rather than other factors.  
26
 In a similar fashion to the earlier test for the DM-bloc, we formally tested whether  is different for the low-volatility 
group of countries by estimating  by pooling the data across both the low- and high-volatility observations, and then 
adding a dummy variable for the low-volatility observations (that is, we added another variable DLV*Zt-1, where DLV is a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 for the low-volatility observations and zero otherwise). Again, the dummy variable was 
both negatively signed and statistically significant, thereby supporting our detailed results in Table 3.3 that the price gap is 
less persistent for the group of observations associated with low-volatility. The results were as follows:  = - 0.0069 – 
0.308 t-1 – 0.039 DLV*t-1 (with t-statistics of 47.7 and 7.48 for t-1 and DLV*t-1 respectively). An F-test of the 
restriction that the parameter for DLV*t-1 is equal to zero was firmly rejected by the data [F-test=26.24]. 
  
enough, there is either very slow or no convergence, while price differentials larger than a 
certain threshold are arbitraged away and hence decay according to a stable AR process. 
In essence, the theoretical model allows for nonlinear adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium. It predicts a sort of regime switching, where the applicable regime depends 
upon the size of the gap. In the statistical literature, this sort of adjustment process is called a 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) process. Recent research shows that multiple-regimes 
threshold models are more powerful tools for modeling purchasing power parity (PPP) in 
the presence of international trade and arbitrage costs.  
Before proceeding to a structural estimation of the TAR process, we provide 
evidence for one of the most fundamental predictions of our band-hypothesis, namely that 
the price-gap adjustment process should be nonlinear, especially when trade costs are high.   
3.2.1 The Tsay test for nonlinearity 
A customary way of testing for nonlinearities in TAR literature is a non-parametric 
test proposed by Tsay (1989).  
Tsay proposes a very general specification test that compares a generic TAR 
alternative against a linear AR  null. The general form of a TAR model, according to the 
terminology chosen by Tsay is: Xt=a0i+ a0ixt-1+eti if r(i)>xt-1>r(i-1). Where r(i) are non trivial 
thresholds. This test works with cases of  data (xt-xt-1) with t=1,…,T. A case data is 
composed of a pair of temporally consecutive changes in the price gaps, e.g. xt-xt-1 is one 
case and xt-1-xt-2 is another. The case data are ordered according to the lagged value of the 
price gap, that decides between which thresholds r(i) each case is located. This process is 
repeated twice, first in ascending and then in descending order. The reason why the test 
should be run with both increasing and decreasing ordering of the arranged case data is of 
practical nature and lies in the fact that, especially in small samples, the case data may not 
  
fall in all of the regimes delineated by every threshold value. In this chapter, we adopt that 
practice and we report only the most significant p-values for each of the two (descending 
and ascending) F-tests. The test goes as follows: we run an AR(1) on the ordered data and 
generate a series of recursive residuals ets on all the case data. We then regress the predictive 
recursive residuals on the dependent variable (the contemporaneous price gap) by OLS, i.e. 
ets=a0+a1xt+uts. If these residuals are orthogonal to the dependent variable, then we can reject 
non-linearity in the adjustment process. The orthogonality test amounts to calculating the 
conventional F statistic for this regression, which for large N approximates a 2 random 
distribution. The intuition of the test is that if there is regime switching, only the first ‘n’ 
cases (falling under the first regime) will show orthogonality properties, while the remaining 
(N-n ) cases will follow a different behaviour revealing the point of switching which should 
be related to the size of the price gap.  
Our results for the Tsay test report all significant maximal 2 (for the DM-bloc at the 
10 percent level of significance). We conclude that we can reject the hypothesis of linearity 
in the data.27 Furthermore, the hypothesis that data are nonlinear in the presence of higher 
trading costs is confirmed.  
3.3 TAR estimation 
As next step, we estimate our nonlinear data using the TAR methodology. While in 
general the adjustment process may display many regimes, evidence of a TAR model in a 
PPP or LOOP model suggests to initially adopt the parsimonious specification that assumes 
just one, symmetric band with one speed of convergence  inside the band and another 
outside the band:   
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 Maximal F and 2  statistics are: (i) entire dataset 2(1)= 8.78 with prob >2 = 0.003 (ii) DM Block 2(1)=  2.71 with 
prob >2 =0.099 and (iii) other EU countries 2(1)=76.88  with prob >2 =0.000 
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where xt the price gap at time t and xt  its lagged value, in and out are the speeds of 
convergence in and out of the band while bhi  and blo define respectively the upper and lower 
band edge. To keep things simple we assume that the band is symmetric around a zero price 
gap, so we have only three parameters to estimate: the two ’s and the absolute value of b. 
The aim is to test the likelihood function of Equation 3-2 against the AR(1) model where 
xt=xt-1+et . This can be done by maximising the likelihood ratio LLR=2(LTAR-LAR1) where 
LTAR and LAR1 are maximum likelihood of the TAR and AR(1) models, respectively.  
3.3.1 Procedure  
Not having the values for the band edges ‘b’ in hand, we must estimate them as a 
first step by means of a search algorithm. The technique that we used for calculating the 
TAR is the following.  
 Step 1: order the absolute values of price gaps by size;  
 Step 2: partition the ordered data into steps of the smallest possible width 
marked by candidate thresholds bk . In our estimation we eliminate partitions 
with 12 or fewer observations in either part of the partition. The only 
limitation to our search is that, in a normal distribution, a commodity point is 
unlikely to be close to the 0th or 100th percentile. For these extreme points 
there are not sufficient observations to provide an efficient estimate, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
  
therefore we select an interval stretching from the 10th  to the 90th percentile 
within which to look for the candidate thresholds.  
 Step 3: for each candidate threshold bk partition the sample in observation 
wholly inside and outside the band and calculate the maximum likelihood 
TAR. Since the TAR model is locally linear, computationally, for any given 
b, the maximum likelihood estimation of the TAR corresponds to an OLS 
estimation on partitioned samples of case data wholly inside or wholly 
outside the threshold.  
 Step 4: After calculating the maximum likelihood estimation of the AR(1) 
model, compute the likelihood ratio LLR=2(LTAR-LAR1). Specifically, we 
define LAR (,) as the estimated log likelihood function for the null AR(1) 
linear model, and define LTAR(in,out,in,out, b) as the estimated log 
likelihood function of the alternative TAR model for a given b.  
 Step 5: estimation ends with a grid search on the value of the band edge b 
that maximises the log likelihood ratio LLR = 2(LTAR – LAR ).  
Conceptually, estimation of the TAR is trivial if one knows the ‘b’ a priori. After all, 
the TAR essentially says that the adjustment is driven by two separate models – one for gaps 
inside the band and one for gaps outside the band. If we knew the value for b, we could 
partition the data into two populations and run a simple AR(1) on the separate sample to 
obtain consistent estimates of the ’s. We must instead estimate it. Following a procedure 
employed, among others, in Taylor (1997), we construct a whole array of provisional 
partitions of the data that we use to find the best TAR approximation to the true model. 
Namely, we define LAR (,) as the estimated log likelihood function for the null AR(1) 
  
linear model, and define LTAR(in,out,in,out, b) as the estimated log likelihood function of 
the alternative TAR model for a given b. Estimation proceeds via a grid search on the value 
of b which maximises the log likelihood ratio LLR = 2(LTAR – LAR ). Since the TAR model 
is locally linear, computationally, for any given b, the maximum likelihood estimation of the 
TAR corresponds to an OLS estimation on partitioned samples of case data wholly inside or 
wholly outside the threshold.  
In keeping with the natural experiment logic, we estimate a TAR for German import 
trade prices vis-à-vis the DM bloc trade partners and a separate TAR for Germany’s trade 
with other EU nations.  
3.3.2 Results 
The results of this procedure are reproduced in Table 3-2. These results are 
consistent with the main predictions of our empirical model. In particular, we find that the 
band-width (b) is greater for trade marked by more volatile exchange rate movements, and 
that the price gap again exhibits greater persistence for German imports from ‘other EU’ in 
comparison to German imports from the DM bloc. Moreover, in line with our priors, we 
find that the adjustment process is faster outside the band (compared to inside) for the 
‘Other EU’ sample:  inside the band the half-life is 1.85 years while outside it is 1.68 years 
and this difference is statistically significant. For the DM bloc trade, however, the two 
adjustment processes are basically identical with the ’s being –0.392 and –0.391.28  
Table 3-2: Summary results for TAR estimation (fixed effect panel) 
 b  out half-life out of band in half-life in band 
      
DM Block 0.460 -0.392 1.394 -0.391 1.399 
                                                   
28
 Another potential criticism of our econometric methodology might be that our results are inconsistent and biased given 
that our T dimension is short, while our N dimension is significantly large (as pointed out by Nickell, 1981). One possible 
way of overcoming these problems is by using GMM estimation as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, we 
did not follow the GMM approach as this becomes computationally complex within a TAR estimation framework, 
particularly with respect to choosing the optimal set of instruments. 
  
 
 (0.011)***  (0.014)***  
 
Other EU 0.734 -0.338 1.683 -0.313  1.845 
 
 (0.036)***  (0.016)***  
Note: Estimation of TAR(2,2,1) using a maximum likelihood grid search over b. 
 
Table 3-3 below  shows the results using fixed effects, but: (a) uses non-demeaned 
data; (b) shows the naïve estimate of  (i.e., AR1 ) as well as estimates of  inside the band 
[i.e.,  (in)]  and outside the band [i.e.,  (out)]; and (c) also experiments with different 
groupings of the data. For example, the left-hand-side of the table shows the results for the 
same two sub-groups as Table 1 in the main text (i.e., ‘DM bloc’ and ‘other EU’), while the 
right-hand-side splits the sample into two sets of observations, one displaying low-volatility 
and the other high-volatility (the resulting split is not country specific since the same import 
supplier may be classed as low-volatility in some years and high-volatility in other years).  
 
 Table 3-3 :Summary results for TAR on country groups and data partitioned according to degree of volatility 
(panel, fixed effects, non-demeaned data) 
ALL  C   Half-life ALL  C   Half-life 
 AR1   0.46 
(.009) 
-0.33 
(.006) 
1.74  AR1   0.46 
(.009) 
           0.33 
(.006) 
1.74 
   (out) 0.79 
(.017) 
-0.40 
(.008) 
1.36    (out) 0.79 
(.017) 
-0.40 
(.008) 
1.36 
   (in) -0.19 
(.014) 
-0.39 
(.019) 
1.41    (in) -0.19 
(.014) 
-0.39 
(.019) 
1.41 
DM  C   Half-life Low-Vol.  C   Half-life 
 AR1   0.46 
(.014) 
-0.37 
(.011) 
1.52  AR1   0.53 
(.013) 
-0.39 
(.009) 
1.40 
   (out) 0.82 
(.040) 
-0.36 
(.017) 
1.56    (out) 0.72 
(.023) 
-0.38 
(.011) 
1.46 
   (in) -0.11 
(.010) 
-0.36 
(.019) 
1.56    (in) -0.20 
(.024) 
-0.33 
(.027) 
1.70 
Other EU  C   Half-life Hi-Vol.  C   Half-life 
 AR1   0.42 
(.014) 
-0.29 
(.008) 
2.02  AR1   0.31 
(.017) 
-0.21 
(.010) 
2.90 
   (out) 1.20 
(.134) 
-0.32 
(.032) 
1.81    (out) 1.01 
(.038) 
-0.47 
(.017) 
1.09 
   (in) 0.30 
(.012) 
-0.31 
(.010) 
1.89    (in) -.08 
(.022) 
-0.41 
(.04) 
1.31 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. C represents the constant. “All” represents Canada, Finland, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and United 
States as well as the DM bloc and other EU nations. 
 
Starting with the left-hand-side of the table and reading down vertically, we see that 
the non-demeaned data give qualitatively the same results as Table 1 in the main text. That 
  
is, for the naïve AR1 specifications (i.e., AR1 ), we see that the DM bloc has the largest 
estimated  - the fastest speed of response – in line with our theoretical predictions (i.e., an 
estimated  of –0.37 for the DM bloc, compared with –0.33 for all groups and –0.29 for the 
other EU countries). However, unlike our earlier results using de-meaned data, using the 
TAR technique the estimated   inside and outside of the bands are not statistically different 
for any of the groups. Meanwhile, turning to the right-hand-side of Table 3, we see that the 
naïve AR1 specifications (i.e., AR1 ) show that the low-volatility observations exhibit a 
higher estimated  compared to the high volatility observations (i.e., -0.39 compared to  –
0.21). Again, this is in line with our theoretical priors that the persistence of price 
differentials is greater for high volatility exchange rates relative to less-volatile bilateral 
exchange rates. Moreover, the results for both the high and low-volatility groupings show 
that  is larger outside of the band in comparison to inside the band, which is again in line 
with our theoretical priors. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter empirically tests a model where firms choose the extent to which they 
can bilaterally ‘price to market’ by investing in mechanisms that increase the cost of cross-
border price arbitrage. Examples of such mechanisms include differentiating products by 
market, or lobbying for regulator controls that make third-party arbitrage expensive. As 
Friberg (2001) showed, the degree of bilateral exchange rate volatility is an important 
determinant of how profitable such segmentation investments may be. Anderton et al (2003) 
goes beyond this by allowing firms a continuous choice of progressively more expensive 
segmentation strategies that result in their being able to maintain correspondingly larger 
price gaps – that we call no-arbitrage bands. A straightforward prediction of their model – 
  
and one that is empirically testable – is that the no-arbitrage bands should be wider for 
bilateral trading relationships where firms anticipate a higher level of exchange rate 
volatility.  
To test this prediction we rely on a ‘natural experiment’ from Europe. While most 
intra-European bilateral exchange rates were volatile in the 1980s and 1990s, one group of 
countries – the DM bloc – consistently maintained very narrow margins of fluctuation. We 
therefore estimate separate threshold autoregressive (TAR) processes for intra-DM bloc 
trade and Germany’s trade with other EU nations. Our results, namely that the intra-DM 
bloc band is narrower, and that the degree of persistence of the price gap for intra-DM bloc 
trade is lower relative to Germany’s other trade, are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions. The implication is that monetary union could produce changes in corporate 
strategies that result in faster cross-border transmission of price movements via the import 
and export price channel which, in turn, would tend to homogenise price movements across 
the member countries of a monetary union.  
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Annex 3.1: Data description 
Our dataset consists of disaggregated annual producer and import price data covering the 
period 1975-1995. We calculated price gaps as the difference, in absolute values, between 
the natural logarithms of the German bilateral import price and the corresponding exporter’s 
producer price indices (base year 1990).Import prices are for 52 (4-digit ISIC rev.2) German 
manufacturing sectors and producer prices from 17 industrialized trade partners (DM-bloc, 
remaining EU countries, Canada, Japan and US) relating to 8 (2-digit ISIC rev.2) sectors. 
Import prices are taken from the OECD’s International Trade by Commodities Statistics 
(ITCS) and have been transformed from SITC rev.3 to ISIC rev.2 in order to be compatible 
with the industrial classification of producer prices. Producer prices are from the OECD 
Indicators of Industry and Services database. All data are measured in national currency of 
the exporter. Exchange rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the first 
difference of the end of period monthly natural log of the nominal exchange rate (IFS) in the 
year preceding period t. 
 

  
Conclusion 
Considering the impact, on trade volumes and prices, of eliminating transaction costs and 
associated currency risk among the countries participating to the European Monetary Union, in our 
thesis we carried out an overview of the costs of crossing borders and an assessment of the 
importance of volatile exchange rates as an impediment to trade and determinant of the border effect. 
Then, we tested euro area trade volume data with a view to formulate some regularities on the trade 
effects of exchange rate regime changes. Finally, we turned to the effect of monetary union and, more 
generally, exchange rate variability on the international transmission of price shocks via the 
imported/exported inflation channel. Throughout the entire analysis, we paid particular attention to 
the industry dimension and at how different industries and industry characteristics are affected by 
exchange rate volatility, uncertainty and regime switches. 
Chapter one highlights that border effect estimations carried out in a multi-country, multi-
currency context reveal a strongly negative influence of volatility on trade, whereas traditional gravity 
specifications fail to identify this. Using this methodology, we find a large and negative impact of 
volatility on relative imports and, once volatility is taken into account, we can reduce the border effect 
in Europe of 50 percent.  
Moreover, in this chapter we highlight that, although empirical estimates based on 
disaggregated trade data can be very insightful, they also have some important drawbacks. In 
particular, the existence of zero observations (non observed commodity flows) between pairs of 
locations might lead to severe estimation caveats. Consequently, the higher the level of 
disaggregation and the degree of industrial specialization are, the more problematic the estimation 
using formal panel regression models is likely to be.  
  
In chapter two, we empirically test a gravity-like model of trade, using a range of different 
specifications. This allows us to experiment on result sensitivity to the chosen specification for 
exchange rate uncertainty, for the size variable of the gravity equation and for different sectors. A first 
set of estimations pools data across countries and sectors, while in a second instance data are pooled 
only across countries, allowing thereby for sectoral differences. 
We introduce both an exchange rate uncertainty term (proxied by two alternative measures: 
the variance of the nominal exchange rate return, VOL, and the absolute forecast premium, AFP) and 
an EMU dummy into our model. The results for both specifications lead us to conclude that the effect 
of exchange rate uncertainty is negative, significant and robust to changes in its specification. 
Furthermore, we also find that exchange rate uncertainty and the EMU dummy are jointly significant. 
This leads us to suspect the existence of non-linearities in the relationship between trade and 
exchange rate volatility and uncertainty.  To pursue this line of thinking, we include a cubic volatility 
term and higher order terms. The results are encouraging and signal the co-existence in the data of a 
convex relationship between volatility and trade and a Monetary Union effect. 
The chapter also highlights a number of caveats and difficulties in precisely assessing the 
extent of trade creation brought about by the EMU. Thus, we suggest considering the figures provided 
by our estimations as upper and lower bounds of the possible range of the effects.  
Chapters one and two underscore the sensitivity of exchange rate volatility coefficients to 
differences in market structures and emphasise the benefits of using industry level data in empirical 
investigations. Industries featuring fragmented markets are greatly harmed, especially in case of 
industries producing a homogeneous product. Similar problems arise in sectors operating in 
segmented markets, but where the product is differentiated.  Volatility seems to harm also 
technology-based and scale-intensive industries as well as those characterised by mainstream 
production and mature, advertising intensive, products. Sectors such as agriculture, mining, quarrying 
  
and basic metals are little – or not at all – affected by the creation of a monetary union in Europe, 
exchange rate volatility or uncertainty. On the contrary, various types of machinery and highly 
differentiated consumer goods such as food products, beverages and tobacco are highly reactive to 
exchange rate developments.  
Chapter three empirically tests a model where firms choose the extent to which they can 
bilaterally ‘price to market’ by investing in mechanisms that increase the cost of cross-border price 
arbitrage. To test this prediction we rely on a ‘natural experiment’ from Europe. While most intra-
European bilateral exchange rates were volatile in the 1980s and 1990s, one group of countries – the 
DM bloc – consistently maintained very narrow margins of fluctuation. We therefore estimate 
separate threshold autoregressive (TAR) processes for intra-DM bloc trade and Germany’s trade with 
other EU nations. Our results, namely that the intra-DM bloc band is narrower, and that the degree of 
persistence of the price gap for intra-DM bloc trade is lower relative to Germany’s other trade, are 
consistent with the theoretical predictions. One obvious implication of our results is that monetary 
union could produce changes in corporate strategies that result in faster cross-border transmission of 
price movements via the import and export price channel which, in turn, would tend to homogenise 
price movements across the member countries of a monetary union. 
 Particularly intriguing are a number of salient features of our results. These may give a hint as 
to promising areas of further research. 
The findings relative to the industry dimension open the door to the possibility that effects like 
the impact of uncertainty on market structure, production modes and factor intensities may represent 
an important dimension of the interplay between currency regimes, exchange rates fluctuations and 
trade.  By extension, further research on the topic may also help to shed light on the fallouts on the 
international distribution of production, on the structure of participating economies and, more 
generally, on the area’s economic geography at large.  
  
On the EMU effect on trade we find that, not only intra-Euro area trade, but also exchanges 
between the euro-area nations and other nations increased with the formation of the EMU. 
Specifically, we estimated what might be called a one-sided euro dummy; its value is unity for any 
trading pair that involves only one Euro-area member (the regular euro dummy, or two-sided dummy, 
is one only for trading pairs where both nations adopted the euro. Our results show that the one-sided 
impact of EMU is lower than the two-sided effect, but still positive.  
This result is intriguing. It provides a very significant hint as to the microeconomics of the 
effect of the formation of a monetary union on trade, or at least part of it. If one could model the 
trade-reducing effects of volatility as a frictional trade barrier, the one-sided dummy should have been 
negative. The monetary union would have been akin to a discriminatory liberalisation and this should 
have reduced the exports of outside nations to markets within the monetary union.  
A second peculiar result concerns the speed of the effect. Although the treaty that laid out the 
path to the euro was signed in 1992, it encountered several major difficulties in becoming law in 
1998. Moreover, the treaty laid down a series of conditions – known as Maastricht conditions – for 
membership in the monetary union, and most European nations had trouble meeting these. Right up to 
the announcement of the names of the inaugural members in 1998, skeptics doubted that the monetary 
union would ever become a reality. Given this, the speed with which the euro’s trade impact 
appeared, is striking and cannot possibly be explained with, for example, the construction of new 
plants related to the unwinding of hedging-related foreign direct investment. 
Third, given the magnitude of the impact of monetary union on trade volumes and the rather 
small size of transaction costs that are eliminated by a currency union, it seem impossible that the 
allowed rise in the exports-per-firm could sufficiently explain the volume response. For example, De 
Grauwe (1994) reports that the buying and selling spreads between the Belgian Franc and various 
industrial country currencies were quite low, approximately 500 basis points. For Europe as a whole, 
  
Emerson et al (1992) estimated all the costs involved in currency exchanges to be only about 0.5 
percent of GDP, with much of this related to the massive turnover associated with asset trade rather 
than goods trade. For smaller, more open member countries with less liquid currency markets, they 
found the cost to be as high as 1% of GDP.  
Finally, it is a fact that a drop in exchange rate volatility can increase the volume of trade in 
two not mutually exclusive ways – by producing more exports per firm, and by increasing the number 
of firms that are engaged in exporting.  
These observations provide a hint to a possible account of the trade effect of a monetary union 
that rests on two main pillars: on the one hand, on the decision of firms to enter the foreign market, 
towards mechanisms in the spirit of the ‘beachhead model’ of Baldwin (1988), where firms must 
incur market entry costs to export and, on the other hand, on the volatility impact on small firms. 
Most firms in the European economies are small, and the vast majority of them do not export 
(Cabral and Mata, 2001). One factor that keeps them from exporting is the combination of the 
uncertainty involved in trade and the nature and relevance of entry costs to the foreign markets. A 
reduction in uncertainty that induces more firms to export and, hence, raises the trade volume could 
explain both the speed and magnitude of the effect. To the extent that exchange rate uncertainty 
influences their decision to export, a sudden and permanent reduction of bilateral volatility within the 
Euro area could lead them to start exporting with little change in their basic production facilities. 
Moreover, following the standard monopolistic competition trade model, the volume of trade is 
proportional to the number of firms/varieties that are traded.  
This account of the facts also explains the observed non-linearities in the trade-volatility 
relationship. These have two possible sources. First, it is often asserted that volatility affects small 
firms more than it affects large ones. Consequently, the marginal impact of lower volatility will be 
large when the initial set of exporting firms includes more small firms. Second, the empirical 
  
distribution of firms in European nations is heavily skewed towards smaller firms. Thus each 
reduction in the minimum size-class necessary for exporting brings forth an ever larger number of 
new exporters. 
To conclude, our thesis represents a contribution to the ongoing research on the impact of 
exchange rate variability, uncertainty and regime switches on trade flows and prices. The “stylized 
facts” emerging from our study suggest a range of possible links and an indication of some of the 
relevant economic channels, which however need to be explored further, both theoretically and 
empirically. There are, of course, many other possible accountings and indeed different lines of 
reasoning will be necessary to explain different aspects of the phenomenon. However, we believe that 
the ones presented in this thesis constitute promising directions for further research.  
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